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ABSTRACT
The Value-relevance of Asset Write-down Regulations in China:
The Roles of Information Relevance and Measurement Reliability
By
YANG Ziyun
Master of Philosophy

At the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st century, China
implemented several new asset write-down regulations. This study addresses the
claim that these regulations significantly enhanced the usefulness of financial
statements for investors in China. The effect of the regulations on usefulness of
financial statements has implications for financial accountants, standard-setters,
educators, and auditors. This study derives and tests some of the empirical
implications of the claim.
I operationalize usefulness of accounting information in terms of the valuerelevance framework, in which information usefulness is construed as a tradeoff
between relevance and reliability. These two dimensions are the primary criteria
underlying the FASB’s Conceptual Framework for choosing alternative accounting
rules. Asset write-down, if correctly applied to over-stated assets, should increase the
decision relevance to investors; however, measurement errors due to either
unintentional mistakes involving professional judgment or intentional
misrepresentations involving earnings management may decrease the reliability of
reported amounts. While there is substantial value-relevance research, the role of
reliability is generally absent. Reliability of regression estimates, also known as
measurement error, is often implicitly assumed and not measured. Following nonnested model selection techniques and relative measurement error research, I
explicitly measure the relative reliability of asset write-down accounting in various
valuation models. Therefore, this study contributes to value-relevance research.
First, I examine the incremental value relevance of asset write-down estimates
through their associations with market values: the ability of asset write-down
provisions to explain market value of equity; the ability of asset write-down gains

and losses to explain annual market-adjusted return; and the ability of both the above
provisions and earnings to explain market value of equity. All the models provide
evidence for value relevance of asset write-down estimates, indicating an acceptable
level of information usefulness with mixed effects of relevance and reliability. I
apply my tests to a balanced panel sample of exchange-listed firms in China over the
period 1998-2001. The sample is limited to A shares—the shares subject to the new
rules.
Next, the above three valuation models are applied again in a reliability analysis.
Model appropriateness tests, i.e. non-nested model tests, are used to answer the
question: did asset write-down practices improve reliability in the valuation models?
I find that the asset write-down practices are approximately comparable in reliability
to historical cost methods in the balance sheet valuation model but somewhat less
reliable in the income statement valuation model. The results are ambiguous when
both assets and earnings are included in a third valuation model. My relative
measurement error tests yield similar results. I conclude that the asset write-down
regulations in China have not improved the usefulness of financial statements to
investors in terms of reliability.
Because the asset write-down rules are subject to interpretation and judgment, I
consider the motivation for write-downs in the final part of the study. The results
support a relation between discretionary motivations and the amount of current or
cumulative write down. A sub-sample analysis shows that asset write-down rules
improve usefulness of financial information in the absence of discretionary
motivations.

I declare that this thesis 《 The Value-relevance of Asset Write-down
Regulations in China: The Roles of Information Relevance and Measurement
Reliability》 is the product of my own research and has not been published in any
other publications.

__________________
YANG Ziyun
September 1, 2003
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivations
The accounting system in China has experienced some major changes during
the past several years. The market experienced a rapid inflow of new accounting
standards, initiated by promulgation of the accounting regulation for listed
companies in 1998. The implementation of the new accounting regulation in 2001
further extended provisions on asset write-down. The rapidity of introduction of
these standards and the wide-ranging effect of some of them (especially those related
to asset write-down) constitute an accounting reform. My motivation stems from the
current debate among standard setters, managers, investors and academic researchers
about the effectiveness of asset write-down regulations in improving the usefulness
of accounting information. The government believes that the new regulations
enhance the truthfulness of reported accounting numbers. However, there appears to
be a wide divergence of opinions among professionals and academics. The
disagreements mainly focus on asset write-down regulations. This is not surprising
given that asset valuation is one of the most contentious issues in accounting. In
particular, those who favor this reform claim that it “squeezed the water out of the
financial statement” and “obviously improved the quality of accounting information”;
while those who are pessimistic about the reform consider it a costless earnings
management opportunity. Occasional comments in Chinese professional articles have
revealed some pros and cons of the accounting reform, but the evidence presented is
not quantitative and the results are not conclusive. The validity of all these claims is
subject to empirical scrutiny, and empirical results may resolve issues that otherwise
could hinder further development of accounting regulation in China. The potential

1

implications for a wide range of financial information users have provided incentives
for this study.
Consistent with Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001, hereafter BBL 2001), the
usefulness of accounting information is defined in terms of value-relevance. Under
this view, accounting information is measured in valuation models and valuerelevance is assessed by its ability to be captured or summarized in share values.1
Relevance and reliability are primary aspects of value-relevance: information is
relevant if it supports investment decision-making and information is reliable if it is
precise and unbiased; tradeoffs between relevance and reliability are important for
investors in judging firms’ expected values.
Asset write-down, under various “lower of cost or market” rules, has been
practiced for decades in the U.S. market, thus research in this area has focused on
decision-making issues rather than value-relevance issues. Because asset write-down
has not been addressed by Chinese accounting standards until very recently, whether
the new convention succeeds or fails to provide more relevant and reliable
information to investors is an important issue. Therefore, the accounting reform in
China provides a good opportunity to test the usefulness of asset write-down
information, as well as the relevance-reliability tradeoffs—issues that few papers
have investigated before. Evidence on any increase or decrease in the usefulness due
to these accounting regulations also has important implications for future regulations.
Hence, research in this area can make both theoretical and practical contributions.

1

For example, value-relevant earnings per share data will be reflected in share prices. Many
value-relevance studies construct models to capture the relations between equity market values and
recognized (disclosed) accounting information. Some studies test whether the coefficients on
accounting numbers are significantly different from zero, with the predicted sign; some studies test
whether the coefficients are significantly different from the theoretically predicted values; other
studies focus on the magnitude of differences among estimated coefficients.
2

1.2. Objectives
This paper seeks to examine empirically some value-relevance issues of the
recently issued asset write-down regulations in China. A broad sample of the
exchange-listed companies will be involved. The first objective of this study is to
answer the question: is asset write-down value-relevant? Associations between asset
write-down information and equity market values will be identified. However,
increases in value-relevance do not necessarily mean that asset write-down practice
has increased the reliability of reported accounting numbers. Therefore, the second
objective is to test the reliability of asset write-down estimates through various
valuation models. The third objective is to uncover motivations behind asset writedown decisions, given the fact that asset write-down practice could be the result of
either asset impairment or discretionary considerations. In addition, this paper will
discuss some emerging econometrics methods in accounting research.

2. Institutional Background
2.1 Stock Markets in China
The government of China organized the Chinese stock market as an initial
vehicle to convert the socialist planned economy into a market economy. Since the
establishment of stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990 and 1991
respectively, the capital market has grown very rapidly. The Chinese stock market
has its distinguishing features. First, the market is geographically diversified. The
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange operate independently
from each other in two different cities and have their own indexes. However, both

3

exchanges are subject to the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC),
and, more importantly, have almost identical is trading rules or trading costs.
Therefore, like previous research, I treat these two stock markets as an integrated
market. Second, the Chinese stock market offers a variety of securities with
orientations to different investors. For example, Chinese companies can issue Ashares, B-shares, and H-shares, all of which have same rights and obligations but
different buyers, trading locations and pricing currencies. Particularly, A-shares are
issued to domestic investors and traded domestically in RMB (Renminbi or ¥); Bshares are issued to foreign investors and traded domestically in US dollars
(Shanghai Stock Exchange) and HK dollars (Shenzhen Stock Exchange); H-shares
are issued to foreign investors and traded only in Hong Kong (HKEx).2 Third, the
stock market has its specific trading rules. 31 December is the statutory fiscal yearend and all financial statements are required to be published within 4 months after
the fiscal year-end. 3 The exchanges formerly employed a “T+0” trading method,
allowing investors to buy and sell the same shares in a day, and there was no limit on
share price fluctuation. Under these rules, the market experienced high volatility in
its early stages. Later, the CSRC implemented a “T+1” trading rule and a 10 percent
fluctuation limit, aimed at stabilizing the market. Nevertheless, the market is still in
its infancy and is politically oriented, resulting in unexpectedly sharp rises and falls.4
Most of the listed companies are state-owned. A number of papers document
overestimation of net assets in these state-owned companies. Aharony et al. (2000)
attribute this kind of overestimation to financial packaging in the initial public

2

A few Chinese companies are listed in the U.S. now. However, they haven’t issued any Ashares yet so I do not include them in my research sample.
3

Late publication of the annual report is allowed only in specific circumstances, which is rare.

4

This may help to explain the relatively low levels of value-relevance of accounting information
reported in prior Chinese market research.
4

offering (IPO) period. They report a significant decline in return on assets (ROA)
from pre-IPO (protected environment) to post-IPO (unprotected, or competitive,
environment). They conclude that the decline in ROA should be imputed to financial
packaging—the overestimation of net assets—during the period of IPO. Lee and Cao
(2002) suggest there is a strong incentive for managers to over-estimate net assets
and earnings in China. They suggest that when state-owned enterprises in China face
financial difficulties, one of the ways out of the difficulty is a capital infusion
through public listing. But the quotas to be listed are limited. Therefore, companies
must queue for listing, and the order is determined by provincial priorities, industry
reputation, and most important, financial performance. The management may avail
itself of asset over-valuation to win the listing quota.
Another result of vying for listing quotas is that some companies may not have
enough time to be restructured to limited-liability companies.

5

Some listed

companies share working places and even management with their mother companies,
generating even more ambiguous ownership structures. In terms of share structure,
traded shares often constitute only a small fraction of total shares, with the majority
of non-outstanding shares held by state agencies, various institutions, and employees.
All these are latent dangers to the further development of this market.
The CSRC, one of the authorities in the Chinese stock market, maintains the
threshold requirements for IPO and stock re-issuance. For example, in the case of
initial pubic offering, the regulation requires:
1.

raised equity should attain RMB 50 million;

5

For example, some restructuring activities include capital contribution, company securitization
and separation of board and management roles.
5

2.

the company is profitable for the three years prior to IPO, and return on
equity (ROE) should equal or exceed 10% in the prior two years;

3.

net tangible assets should be at least 35% of total tangible assets.
In the case of re-issuance, the company should attain an average 10% ROE for

the prior three years, and at least 6% in each year. In order to protect investors,
according to The Listing Regulation for Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges,
stock shares will be specially treated when a listed company experiences two
consecutive annual net losses. These shares will be labeled “ST”.6 If loss continues in
the next fiscal year, share trading will be suspended and the shares are only
particularly transferred.7 Such shares are labeled “PT”. Otherwise, the “ST” label is
removed in that year. The “PT” label will be followed by de-listing if the company
has another consecutive annual loss.
The IPO regulations and listing rules depend on reliable accounting numbers.
CSRC cannot prevent companies from generating unreliable accounting numbers.
Unreliability may even be increased by the threshold accounting requirements.8 The
accounting reform is an attempt by regulators to address this problem.

2.2 Accounting Reform
The accounting regulation for listed companies (hereafter, AR1998) was issued
in 1998 and is a starting point of the latest accounting reform. Actually, the Chinese
accounting system has been continually updated, in step with the booming economy.

6

The special treatment includes, among other things, a 5% daily ceiling in price performance and
an audited mid-year financial statement. Other situations that could incur “ST”: (a) accounting fraud,
(b) adverse audit opinion, and (c) net assets fall under the registered capital.
7

Shares can only be traded on Friday with the assembly open price.

8

Studies have documented that threshold requirements may become the motivations to conduct
earnings manipulation (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997).
6

Before AR1998, listed companies were subject to numerous regulations and
standards of accounting and finance, known as the “two regulations and two
standards” system. AR1998 and its affiliated new accounting standards adapt
International Accounting Standards (IAS) to the current condition of China, aiming
at resolving the overestimation problem and improving the quality of accounting
information. AR1998 introduced asset write-down rules. The rules are lower-of-costor-market (LCM) rules and not asset revaluation rules, i.e. revaluation downward is
required and revaluation upward is not allowed. Although the government urged
early adoption, listed companies were not immediately subject to these write-down
regulations, except for companies with B or H shares. Most of the domestic A-share
companies elected to wait until the issuance of documents No.35 and No.49 in 1999.
These two documents mandated asset write-down for all the listed companies
beginning in the year 1999. Asset write-down regulations were expanded in 2000.
The new regulation, The Accounting Regulation (hereafter AR2001 because it is
enforced in year 2001), extends the scope of write-down together with other
conservative methods. 9 It also regulates accounting for related party transactions.
These write-down rules may help in estimating the correct value of net assets.

2.3 Asset write-down regulations
AR1998 requires that four assets (accounts receivables, inventories, short-term
and long-term investments) be assessed for impairment. It sets out factors to be
considered at each balance sheet date that may indicate impairment. External
indications of impairment include a decline in an asset’s market value; significant
adverse changes in the technological, market, economic or legal environment; and

9

For example, organization costs must be expensed immediately rather than being capitalized.
7

increases in market interest rates. Internal indications may be evidence of
obsolescence or physical damage of an asset; changes in the way an asset is used;
and evidence from internal reporting that the economic performance of an asset is, or
will be, worse than expected. If an indicator of impairment is present, these assets
should be carried at the lower of historical cost or fair value (LCM) and losses are
recognized in income. Different fair values are specified in AR1998, for example,
fair value for accounts receivables and long-term investments is the recoverable
amount, which is the higher of net selling price (NSP) and value in use (VIU); fair
value for short-term investments is market value; and fair value for inventories is
NSP. Specifically, write-down provisions are credited and expenses are debited, and
the provisions offset the original assets. The expense from accounts receivables
provisions and inventories provisions is carried into operating income and the
expense from the other two provisions is carried into non-operating income.
Application of the write-down regulations in AR1998 was optional for A-share
companies in 1998. It became mandatory for all listed companies in 1999. The initial
regulations, however, confused many accountants as to how to deal with the
impairment losses. A direct charge to current profits was preferred; but some argued
that the impairment could have occurred in prior years so the related loss should be
charged to accumulated, rather than current profits. Both methods are allowed in
1998. The follow-up regulations, especially documents No.35 and No.49, gave
companies the option of a one-time-only charge to accumulated profits in the first
year of adoption, i.e. 1999. After adoption, the amounts of provisions are either
recognized or disclosed in the balance sheets and the amounts of losses are
recognized in the income statements.

8

Listed companies were asked to provide another four write-down provisions in
AR2001 with effect from 2001, namely fixed assets, construction in progress,
intangible assets, and commission loans. These four assets are less likely to have
market values, rendering impairment assessment more difficult. 10 In particular,
commission loans were rarely recognized by companies in their accounts, let alone
being subject to loss provisions. 11 Again, the listed companies had the one-time
option of charging the losses related to these four assets to accumulated profits rather
than to current profits. Write-down losses are not tax deductible except for bad debt
allowance. Table 1 summarizes the asset write-down requirements.
[Table 1here]
IAS 36 articulates the impairment of assets. It requires that all assets are subject
to the impairment rules of IAS 36 except inventories, construction contract assets,
deferred tax assets, financial assets and employee benefit assets. It sets out factors to
be considered which may indicate impairment, and its content is much richer than
that in AR1998 or AR 2001. In order to operationalize the concept of VIU, IAS 36
defines the concept of cash-generating unit (CGU). When cash flows are not readily
identifiable as being specific to a particular asset, the smallest group of related assets
should be identified. A CGU generates cash inflows that are largely independent of

10

Because of this difficulty, the regulation specifies recoverable amount as fair value, but
recoverable amount may also be difficult to estimate for these assets.
11

Commission loans are loans entrusted by the Chinese listed companies to investment
companies in the expectation of good returns in the stock market. Theses loans were classified as
short-term or long-term investments, depending on the terms. Commission loans emerged in China
several years ago when listed companies over-raised funds in the capital market and the stock market
was prosperous. Aggressive companies lent idle money to other companies, usually investment
companies, to earn promised lucrative returns, which were often realized in the bull market of the
period, and became profits to the listed companies. However, China experienced a bear market, and
many investment companies suffered heavy losses. The promised return was gone and sometimes the
principal was impaired. Despite that, this practice still exists. It is obviously against the interest of
minority shareholders if the commission loans are not disclosed clearly and separately in the balance
sheet. The CSRC uncovered the situation and required independent disclosure and write-down of
commission loans.
9

the cash inflows from other assets or group of assets. The CGU is a reasonable basis
for write-down of goodwill and head office assets and is likely to be incorporated in
future write-down regulations in China.

2.4 Sources of noise in asset write-down and related gains and losses
Some observers have expressed concerns about the rapid implementation of
asset write-down regulations, claiming that write-down provides an opportunity for
earnings management.12 Healy and Whalen (1999) define earnings management as a
situation in which managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring
transactions to alter financial reports either to mislead some shareholders about the
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. The asset write-down process
involves discretion, both in identification and quantification. Moreover, write-downs
and related gains and losses will alter the balance sheet and income statement
directly. The possibility of earnings management, therefore, does exist. Earnings
management, if it does occur, introduces noise in the accounting signals.
A variety of factors contribute noise to write-down estimations. One of the
motivations of earnings management is meeting simple benchmarks such as avoiding
losses, reporting increases in profits, and meeting analysts’ expectations. However,
the last benchmark actually applies only to a small proportion of listed companies in
China.13 The only benchmarks that matter to all listed companies are avoiding losses
or reporting growths. Two kinds of earnings manipulation can be observed in the

12

China Securities, one of the leading finance newspapers in China, has published many articles
on related topics. For example, Four assets write-down, not enough yet (04/08/2000) and Talk about
annual reports: asset write-down is the key to earnings (30/03/2001).
13

Because the Chinese market has relatively few analysts, there are not many earning forecasts
for listed companies.
10

Chinese market—big bath and minimum profit. A firm that experiences losses in two
successive fiscal years incurs trading and reporting restrictions imposed by the CSRC.
Maximum daily stock price change is reduced from 10 percent to 5 percent, and the
firm must submit an audited mid-year financial statement. If the firm cannot turn
“green” (profitable) in the third year, it will incur further restrictions, such as Fridayonly trading. Both restrictions increase the visibility of these firms and reduce their
attractiveness to investors, a situation that managers would like to avoid. The big
bath can be used to shift losses for two years to losses in one year, thereby avoiding
an “ST” or “PT” punishment.14 The alternative, and more conservative, method is
maintenance of marginal profit every year, thereby avoiding the CSRC watch list.
The latter strategy becomes more imperative if the firm has experienced two
consecutive net loss years. Because the regulations do not formally distinguish size
of loss, only the continuation of losses, it would appear that the big bath strategy is
preferable. Informally, however, a very large loss will attract market attention with
possible political costs and a change in management.15
Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are strong incentives to manipulate
earnings by manipulating the asset write-down provisions and the related gains and
losses. The cost is low for two reasons. First, the write-down regulation is a new
regulation to both accountants and auditors. Public accountants may lack sufficient
experience in assessing impairment in this early implementation period. Most of the
assets subject to impairment do not have ready market prices and fair values must be
estimated. VIU estimation involves assumptions and forecasts. Moreover, unlike

14

For example, taking a big bath in the first loss year increases the possibility of a profit rebound
next year, thus avoiding “ST” status. Taking a big bath in the second loss year, although not avoiding
“ST” status, could help to avoid falling into “PT” status in the third year.
15

However, the new regulation was a good excuse to take a big bath, which alleviates the
political cost greatly.
11

other accounts, auditors do not have comparative data on past write-downs. Second,
the regulation offers choices to managers, who, in provisions for bad debts, can
choose among different estimation methods and different write-down percentages.
Finally, the regulation does not mandate detailed disclosure of the write-down. 16
These factors reduce the cost of manipulation. Unsophisticated investors may
overlook provision percentages, offset of provisions, and asset swaps.17 Some firms
have been able to achieve amazing paper profits under the regulation.18
On the other hand, the monitoring mechanism in the China stock market is still
primitive and flawed (Chen et al. 2002). Despite the engagement of the CSRC,
investors remain critical of accounting reform. Auditor independence is impaired
because of weak corporate governance and rampant intervention by the government,
with the result that intended reforms often lead to unintended consequences (Lee and
Cao 2002). Despite expansions and mergers among local accounting firms in China,
audit quality has been little improved. The monitoring mechanism is further impaired
because the majority shareholders can withhold important information.
This paper reports empirical tests of predictions of the value-relevance of the
mandated asset write-down. Measuring the noise in the write-down amounts is a key
issue in this paper. Identifying sources of measurement noise will help strengthen the
conclusions in this paper. Both results could inform regulators about possible

16

AR2001 requires a separate schedule showing write-downs, but not all listed companies
prepared such a schedule.
17

Some listed companies swap assets, mainly with their related companies or mother companies.
The swap may be the most efficient way to generate profit in China. The swap works this way: a
deeply impaired asset is traded as if no impairment has ever occurred; the write-down provisions are
then taken back, increasing the current earnings. The “profit” generated by a swap is against the
regulation. Without sufficient disclosure of the write-down provisions, it is hard to trace the source of
the profits.
18

By an asset swap and writing back the provision made in the prior year, ST Shenxinkai, a listed
company in China, increased its profits by 2200 percent in fiscal year 2001.
12

problems of their existing write-down policies, and further, give relief to auditors
who are bearing increasing risks nowadays.

3. Literature Review
3.1. The value-relevance research
Reflecting in part the wealth of valuation models, there are many studies on the
empirical relation between stock market values (or changes in values) and particular
accounting numbers. One purpose of this research is to assess, or provide a basis for
assessing, usefulness of those numbers in an accounting standard.

19

With

comprehensive analyses of relations between write-down numbers and market values,
this study contributes to a line of research that has been called the “value-relevance”
literature (Holthausen and Watts 2001, here after HW2001). Three categories of
value-relevance research may be identified: relative association studies, incremental
association studies, and marginal information content studies. The first two
categories are called association studies. The relative and incremental studies both
capture associations between stock market values and accounting numbers over
relative long windows. The only difference between these two types of studies is that
the degree of association is compared relatively between alternative bottom line
measures in the relative studies and incrementally among different independent
variables in the incremental ones. The third category typically includes event studies
using a short window to determine if the release of an accounting number is
associated with value changes. Despite its popularity, HW2001 criticize the
19

There are papers addressing the value-relevance of accounting information without regard to
standard setting. For example, the information content research and earnings response coefficient
research (Kothari 2001).
13

usefulness of value-relevance research in standard setting. They conclude that the
association criterion is not theoretically rigorous and that the models used in the
literature are not well-specified. BBL2001, on the other hand, support the usefulness
of value-relevance research in standard setting. The opposing views are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. As value-relevance research develops, it is more
firmly grounded in theory, and the models employed are better specified. Thus valuerelevance research may become more important to standard setting.
3.1.1. Value-relevance research over long-term periods
This area of research examines the time-series behavior of the value-relevance
of accounting numbers. A large sample of companies and a long time period are
often employed in this kind of research in order to abstract from transitory and
individual firm effects. Ely and Waymire (1999) examine earnings’ value-relevance
under different accounting regimes, namely, CAP (Committee on Accounting), APB
(Accounting Principles Board), and FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board).
They examine earnings for yearly samples of NYSE common stocks during 19271993 and point out that earnings’ value-relevance varies when the accounting regime
changes. They measure value-relevance by adjusted R-squares of a cross-sectional
regression model of 16-month market-adjusted returns on annual earnings change
and level. However, their argument is weakened by a research design that does not
permit causal inferences. They do suggest additional research to examine the impact
of specific standards on value-relevance of accounting data.
In another paper, Francis and Schipper (1999) investigate the claim that
financial accounting information has become less value-relevant over time,
specifically over the period 1952-94. They test value-relevance using two measures:
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the ability of earnings to explain annual market-adjusted returns and the ability of
earnings and book values of assets and liabilities to explain market values of equity.
They argue that if value-relevance of financial statement information has declined
over time, they should expect to observe a decline in earnings’ ability to explain the
cross-sectional variation in security returns. Similarly, they expect that, if valuerelevance of balance sheet information has declined over time, the ability of these
variables to explain market equity values will also decline. The results show that the
explanatory power of the book value of equity increased, while that of earnings
decreased, during the test periods. Their paper provides measures of value-relevance
for both balance sheet and income statement numbers.
There are a few papers that focus on value-relevance issues in the Chinese
capital market, such as Chen, Chen, and Su (2001a). They find that accounting
information is value-relevant both in price models and income statement models in
the period 1992 to 1998. Chen, Chen, and Su (2001b), investigate the institutional
setting in China. They find that modified opinions of independent auditors are related
with earnings management for meeting the regulatory profitability requirements.
Similarly, Lee and Cao (2002) investigate earnings in China and conclude that valuerelevant accounting information is related to regulations. All the evidence shows that
despite the primitive setting in Chinese capital market, accounting information is
value-relevant to some degree.
3.1.2. Fair value accounting research
Another kind of value-relevant research—fair value accounting research—is a
primary focus of the FASB and IASB (International Accounting Standards Board).
Advocates of fair value accounting believe that it provides more relevant measures of
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assets, liabilities and earnings than historical cost accounting (Barth 1994). Fair value
accounting involves the recognition or disclosure of current costs or market values of
assets and liabilities, as well as earnings derived from fair values. Numerous
standards have focused on fair value accounting issues over the past decades. 20 I
summarize this sort of value-relevance research here because fair value accounting
and LCM accounting are related. Both are mandated by standards, and both provide,
in effect, a book value and a fair value.21 BBL2001 classify several sets of fair value
accounting studies.
One set of studies focuses on pension and other postretirement obligations
(OPEB). A fundamental question relating to pensions and OPEB is whether pension
assets and liabilities and OPEB liabilities are perceived by investors as assets and
liabilities of the firm.22 Findings suggest that these assets and liabilities are perceived
by investors as assets and liabilities of the firm but with reduced reliability, causing
smaller pricing multiples (Amir 1993, Barth 1991, Barth, Beaver and Landsman
1992).
Another set of studies addresses questions relating to fair values of debt and
equity securities. Barth (1994) investigates how disclosed fair value estimates of
banks’ investment securities and gains and losses based on those estimates are
reflected in share prices in comparison with historical costs. She tests the incremental
explanatory power of disclosed fair value estimates and gains/losses by adding these
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Great effort has been put on financial instruments, e.g. SFAS Nos. 105, 107, 114, 115, 118, 119,
125, 133, and 138, and Preliminary Views, 1999; IAS Nos. 32 and 39 are among the longest of the
international accounting standards.
21

The accounting reform in China follows the lower of cost or market model rather than fair
value accounting. That is, it is more conservative than that of the FASB and IASB and prohibits
upward revaluation of assets. Fair values in China are disclosed only if they are lower than book
values.
22

A positive (negative) relation should exist between assets (liabilities) and share prices.
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to the balance sheet and income statement models respectively. A coefficient
significantly different from zero implies value-relevance. The findings indicate that
fair values have explanatory power beyond historical cost, and are robust to several
alternative specifications. The relevance of fair value gains and losses differ with
different specifications, which implies they are estimated with sufficient error to
make value-relevance difficult to establish. Furthermore, Barth discusses the
reliability of fair value amounts in several aspects, thereby providing a basis for the
measurement error research that I review next. Another paper in this set is Barth,
Beaver and Landsman (1996). It provides evidence that fair value estimates of loans,
securities and long-term debt disclosed under SFAS No.107 provide significant
explanatory power for bank share prices beyond that provided by related book values.
Other studies question the reliability of some fair values, such as those for nonfinancial intangible assets, derivatives and tangible long-lived assets. A fundamental
question these studies address is whether these fair value estimates are reliable.
These studies do not consistently find significant value-relevance for fair values. For
example, estimates for intangible assets have a significantly positive relation with
share prices and this finding holds for a variety of revalued intangible assets and
brands (Aboody and Lev 1998, Eccher, Ramesh, and Thiagarajan, 1996), while
studies generally fail to find value-relevance for tangible long-lived assets or
derivatives (Beaver and Ryan 1985). The finding is usually attributed to biased and
unbiased measurement error, where management discretion introduces biased error.

3.2. Reliability and the measurement error research
As I noted in section 3.1.2, although the reliability of fair value numbers is often
questioned, a significant incremental association, reflected in a significant coefficient
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on fair value accounting data, is found in most of the papers and interpreted as
evidence that the accounting number meets the FASB’s two prime criteria of
relevance and reliability (HW2001). The FASB’s Conceptual Framework is set forth
in Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) Nos. 1 through 7, which
articulate FASB’s objectives and criteria in its standard setting decisions. Under
SFAC No. 5, an accounting amount is relevant if it is capable of making a difference
to financial statement users’ decisions; an accounting amount is reliable if it
represents what it purports to represent. The accounting amount has a predicted
significant relation with share prices only if the amount reflects information that is
relevant to investors in valuing the firm and is measured reliably enough to be
reflected in share prices. However, results for relevance and reliability are mixed in
the incremental value-relevance research. Increased relevance can offset decreased
reliability so that the final result is value-relevant. Assuming that an accounting
regulation mandates relevant information, reliability becomes a more important issue.
For example, both cash flows and earrings are relevant in the decision-making
process, and both show value-relevance in the empirical research. However,
reliability may well be different for these two measurements, resulting in different
levels of observed effect in valuation models.
Recent years have seen emerging studies on reliability. Managements
responsible for preparing financial statements have better information than auditors
and investors and have an incentive to misrepresent due to, for example, the
compensation problem. The reliability studies suggest that management discretion
(biased measurement error) and unbiased estimation error—together known as
measurement error—play an important role in reducing information usefulness. The
measurement error interpretation is especially important to the fair value accounting
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debate because critics of the method cite the questionable reliability of fair value
estimates as a major reason against using fair value accounting (Barth 1994).
Though some papers attribute insignificant value-relevance to measurement
error, they neither quantify the error nor demonstrate the way error affects valuerelevance. Measurement error research is an emerging topic (Barth 1991, 1994, Choi
et al. 1997, Boone 2002). These studies are based on 1970’s econometrics research
and attempt to use measurement errors to explain the quality of accounting
information. The main idea of measurement error research is that, assuming efficient
markets, errors and biases will be reflected in the value-relevance of accounting
numbers. For example, if all the accounting numbers are true and unbiased,
according to the measurement perspective, they should fit the theoretical models
perfectly and have a zero estimated intercept, a theoretically correct estimated slope
coefficient, and a zero residual. Actually, accounting numbers have measurement
error, and thus the estimated regression model has observed error terms and
coefficients that differ from those predicted. The magnitude and sign of the bias is
dependent on the correlation structure among the true values of the independent
variables and the measurement error (Barth 1991).
One group of papers attempts to quantify and compare the specific errors in
balance sheet accounting numbers. I call this measurement error research. This
research is distinguished by its “one to one” assumption that one dollar of assets
should be priced at one dollar if measured correctly. Barth (1991) investigates
measures of pension assets and liabilities disclosed under SFAS 87 to determine
which most closely reflect intrinsic values that investors implicitly assign.
Measurement errors are investigated through their variances, which are estimated and
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further evaluated with chi-square tests in her 1991 paper.23 The larger the variance is,
the bigger the measurement error is. The fair value of plan assets is found to have
less measurement error than that disclosed in SFAS 87 and the book value of pension
assets. The results also indicate that accumulated benefit obligation exhibits the least
measurement error. The study has policy implications for SFAS 87 and is consistent
with investors viewing the compromises made in SFAS 87 as rendering the amounts
to be recognized less relevant and reliable than disclosed measures. Choi et al. (1997)
extend Barth’s setting and measure the “noise ratio,” defined as the ratio of
measurement error variance to the total variance of the accounting measure. Balance
sheet items with large noise ratios are interpreted as lacking reliability. Boone (2002)
further compares measurement errors in the oil and gas assets and finds that that
measurement error in present value measure is on average less than that in the
historical cost measure. Plausible assumptions are made under which he estimates
the variance of measurement error in a way different from the Barth’s approach.
There are limitations to these results. First, the analysis is confined to the
balance sheet model, in which the theoretical coefficient for book value of an asset
should be one. But the balance sheet does not report all net assets. Internally
generated goodwill is specifically excluded from recognition in the accounts. The
effect is one of omitted variables. This effect is known to cause bias in coefficients of
included variables. Second, the studies require homogenous settings in their sample,
with observations of similar size and from the same industry. The results may not be
generalizable to a more heterogeneous setting.
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Barth (1991) mentions the Gallant and Jorgenson (1979) chi-square statistic, which is used to
test significance of the restrictions that measurement error variances are equal.
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The other school of research uses more general methods to test measurement
error. The non-nested model selection technique is employed. Dechow (1994) uses
the income statement model to investigate the relative value-relevance of earnings
and cash flows, where value is measured by stock returns. By using the non-nested
model selection test of Vuong (1989), Dechow finds that residuals of the operating
cash flow regression are larger in magnitude than those from the earnings regression.
Since only one independent variable is employed each time, the regression’s residual
error can be attributed to the measurement error in that independent variable. Hence,
earnings appear to be more reliable than operating cash flows. Conditional on value
relevance, this kind of model appropriateness test is accepted in the current valuerelevance studies as a way of analyzing measurement error. Jennings et al. (1998)
investigates the effects of corporate restructurings on the usefulness of the balance
sheet model. By using the Vuong test, they find more useful (reliable) information in
the book values with restructuring adjustments than that without.
The non-nested model methods are not flawless. If relevance varies across
valuation models, a result attributed to reliability could be caused by changes in
relevance. In multiple regression, residuals are determined by the fit of all
independent variables. With several explanatory variables, the residuals cannot be
attributed to measurement error of a particular independent variable.

3.3 Asset write-down and earnings management research
Many papers relate write-down issues with management opportunism. Rees et al.
(1996) examine the extent to which discretionary write-offs are value-relevant rather
than opportunistic. Unlike most prior studies, they do not equate earnings
management with opportunistic behavior. Instead, they consider the possibility that
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managers use this discretion to convey signals to investors. The authors find
evidence that write-offs tend to occur contemporaneously with large incomedecreasing operating accruals. Further, Rees et al. examine the relation between
earnings and returns for their sample by regressing the return variable on earnings
per share, abnormal operating accruals per share, and per share effect of asset writedown. The significantly positive coefficient on the abnormal operating accruals
further strengthens the authors’ assumption that these accruals are not opportunistic.
Elliott and Hanna (1996) use a comprehensive data set and innovative tests to
document a decline in the information content of earnings for firms with multiple
write-offs. They measure earnings information content in two ways: a nonparametric
statistic to assess the abnormal price movement on the day of an information event,
and an earnings response coefficient (ERC) test. The authors find that firms reporting
a sequence of write-offs experience declining levels of earnings as the sequence
lengthens. In other words, the poorer the performance is, the more frequently the
firm writes off assets. The authors also find that information content of earnings
declines for firms with frequent write-offs, as ERCs are lower when the frequency of
write-offs increases.
Francis et al. (1996) provide evidence on the causes and shareholder wealth
effects of discretionary asset write-offs. They suggest that the absence of explicit
guidance for many asset write-offs permit substantial management discretion as to
amount and timing of asset write-offs. In order to test their hypotheses, the authors
investigate the extent to which proxies for management manipulations and proxies
for asset impairments explain write-off decisions. Proxies for asset impairment
include stock market return, book-to-market ratios and ROA. They also include
variables to proxy for the historical performance of the firm’s industry. Proxies for
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manipulation include position changes in management, current year’s earnings, and
other measures. 24 A weighted tobit model is used to test the importance of the
proxies on the asset write-off decision. They find that impairment proxies are
significant in explaining asset write-offs, and the results are inconsistent with the
predictions of big bath and incoming smoothing. An income statement model is
employed to test shareholder wealth effects. The authors find significant negative
reaction to the announcement of write-offs. They interpret this result as the investors’
responses being driven more by impairment perspectives than by a future
performance perspective.
Wilson (1996) suggests that future research should view write-off numbers as
having three parts: a measurement construct component, a measurement error
component, and a manipulation component. The first component is the unbiased
amount assessed by experts, the second component captures the dispersion of these
hypothetical measures from the consensus estimate, and the third component
represents an intentional effort to misrepresent either for personal gain or for
signaling. Obviously, measurement error research is prominent in the area of asset
write-down.
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They claim that management takes write-offs in periods that they experience an unusual income
increase. However, it is true that management also could shift future earnings into the current period.
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4 Research Design
4.1. Value-relevance test
The empirical investigation of value-relevance reported here is based on three
conventional cross-sectional models. 25 One is a balance sheet model in which I
investigate the amount of write-down provisions; the second is an income statement
model in which write-down gains and losses are investigated through their
associations with capital market returns.26 Both the balance sheet model and income
statement model are derived from the so called “capitalization model”.27 Additionally,
I use a hybrid “price” model, derived from the “Feltham-Ohlson” model, that
incorporates both assets and earnings in one model.
4.1.1 Balance Sheet Model
The incremental explanatory power of write-down provisions is assessed by
estimating the relation between the market value of equity and the book value of
equity. I calculate the market value of equity from its share price, adjusting any reissuance effects. The book value of equity is expressed as a combination of reported
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Varieties of valuation models are discussed in Appendix A, part 1, where I discuss valuation
theories and model interrelations.
26

Researchers use numerous approaches to calculate the firm’s intrinsic values (Kothari 2001).
Two mainstreams of valuation research are the capitalization model and the residual income model.
Two perspectives exist in the capitalization model—the balance sheet and the income statement. The
balance sheet model measures firm value as the cumulative effect of past operating results. The
income statement model measures firm value by earnings capitalization. This model focuses on the
expectation of future operating results.
27

As Easton and Harris (1991) point out, the income statement model is just a first-difference
form of the capitalization model. Assume only earnings and dividends affect stock holder’s equity,
also known as the “clean surplus” condition. We can express the change of price Pt with the following
equation: ∆Pt = ∆Assett+ ∆Liabilityt = ∆Equityt = Et -dt, where assets, liabilities, and equity are
measured on a per-share basis. Next, divide both sides by last year’s price Pt-1 and obtain the income
statement model Rett= (∆Pt + dt)/Pt-1 = Et/Pt-1. By the same token, another form of income statement
model can be derived from the earnings capitalization model, expressed as Rett=∆ Et/Pt-1 (Note Pt=Et
in earnings capitalization model). Both income statement models (level and change) are used in
existing papers.
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assets and liabilities, as well as balances on write-down provisions.28 Annual and
pooled linear regressions are developed. Because value-relevance of write-down
estimates may differ across companies and years in my pooled regression, violating
the homogeneity assumption of panel regression, I control both firm effects and year
effects in the pooled regression.29
The estimation equation is:
MVEit = α 0 + α 1 BVA0 it + α 2 BVLit + α 3 BVAH it + α 4 PROVit + υ it

(1)

where i and t denote firms and years; MVE is market value of common equity three
months after the fiscal year-end when most firms have published their financial
statements; BVA0 is book value of assets that are not affected by write-down
regulations, namely, cash and cash receivable, prepayments and some other current
and non-current assets; BVL is book value of liabilities; BVAC (not used in this
equation) is book value of assets subject to write-down regulations as reported on the
financial statement, while BVAH is the historical cost amount of those assets. 30
PROV is sum of write-down provisions. All variables are deflated by the number of
common shares outstanding adjusted for stock splits and dividends to mitigate effects
of heteroskedasticity. In the pooled regression, time and firm specific dummy
variables are added to get a robust estimation, summarized in the constant term α0 in
equation (1). Incremental explanatory power of write-down provisions will be
observed if the amount is a value-relevant asset.
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A similar balance sheet model can be found in, e.g., Landsman (1986).

29

Known as fixed effect regression. Please see Appendix A, Part III, for a detailed discussion on
methodologies of pooled sample regression.
30

This number is not reported. It is computed by writing back the write-down provisions to
BVAC.
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A significant t-statistic on PROV in equation (1) will indicate that write-down
provisions provide explanatory power incremental to historical costs (Barth, et al.
1996). Auditors tend towards revaluing impaired assets down to reflect the fair
values if management fail to do so, lessening book value of equities. This reasoning
suggests that the write-down provision will most likely have a negative association
with market value of equity. One the other hand, write-down provisions are
discretionary accruals through which managements convey information to outsiders.
For example, managers could signify future profitability through intensified writedown activities before restructuring or after assigning new management, which could
be treated positively by investors. Therefore, the coefficient on PROV could also be
positive. Other asset variables are expected to attain positive coefficients and liability
variables to be negative.
4.1.2 Income Statement Model
Analogously, gains and losses resulting from write-down activities are also
investigated in one of the capitalization models, the income statement model.
Reported earnings level, earnings change and write-down gains and losses are
regressed on market returns. A 12-month holding return is calculated in this study. If
the market is complete and perfect, the coefficient on permanent earnings would
equal the reciprocal of the cost of capital, while those on transitory earnings would
equal one.31 The coefficient should equal zero when the amount is not treated as
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Miller and Modigliani (1966) only use earnings change as the dependant variable. Ohlson
(1989) develops a model in which both earnings level and earnings change are relevant. Ohlson uses
the symbol ρ to denote the identical theoretical coefficients for earnings level and earnings change,
where ρ equals the reciprocal of the required return (ρ =1/r + 1), a constant coefficient across firms
and time periods. Ohlson further shows that the theoretical coefficient for earnings change will be kρ
while that for earnings level will be (1-k)ρ, k being the weight assigned between earnings change and
level, if both level and change are used in the same equation. Easton and Harris (1991) report that,
whereas in univariate regressions both level and change of earnings exhibit close relation with returns,
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value-relevant (Easton 1999). Both earnings level and earnings change can explain
market returns if earnings information is value-relevant. Existing papers use either
one or both ones as explanatory variables.
The estimation equation is:

Rit = β 0 + β 1 Eith + β 2 ∆Eith + β 3WDGLit + ν it

(2)

where i and t denote firms and years respectively; R is the 12-month stock return
ending three months after fiscal year-end, absorbing most accounting information
after companies releasing financial statements; Eh is current earnings before any asset
write-down adjustments—current or retrospective; ∆Eh is the change in Eh; WDGL is
write-down gains or losses, and equals the changes of write-down provisions after a
retrospective adjustment.32 All independent variables are deflated by the number of
common shares outstanding adjusted for stock splits and dividends and by the last
fiscal year’s ending share prices.
Equation (2) permits assessing whether write-down gains and losses provide
explanatory power in explaining stock returns beyond historical earnings and
whether they are treated the same as ordinary gains and losses. If the WDGL are
considered to be more subject to discretion, they should be less persistent and thus
their coefficient, β3, should be relatively smaller than that of earnings level or
earnings change. Reducing assets causes losses and writing back provisions creates
gains. Writing back is prohibited by regulations in China but some companies still
achieve writing provisions back to equity indirectly, e.g. assets swap. On the whole,
the WDGL should appear as a loss in the pooled sample and therefore β3 should be
in multivariate regression earnings level seems to dominate the whole equation, although the effect of
earnings change still exists.
32

Taking back the write-down provisions may generate income when, for example, an asset swap
takes place between related companies. Though Chinese GAAP prohibits this kind of profit generated
from non-arm’s length transactions, it is difficult to regulate.
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negative in equation (2). Occasionally, managements write assets down to convey
good news to investors, for example, excessive current year income. I do not exclude
the possibility that investors treat these losses positively in valuing firms. Again, I
control fixed effects in equation (2) when conducting pooled regressions.
4.1.3 Price Model

The price model examines the ability of write-down provisions and the related
gains and losses to explain market equity values in one model. That is:
MVEit = γ 0 + γ 1 BVEH it + γ 2 PROVit + γ 3 Eith + γ 4WDGLit + ω it

(3)

where i and t denote firms and years; All the variables are described in equations (1)
and (2) except BVEH, which is the book value of net assets prior to any write-down.
I deflate all the variables in equation (3) with the adjusted outstanding shares and
control the fixed effects in pooled regressions.

4.2. Reliability Test
As one of the criteria the FASB uses to choose accounting standards, reliability
plays an important part in accounting research. Assume that the write-down
provisions and the associated gains and losses are value-relevant in the research
period. This does not necessarily imply that lower of cost or market accounting
(LCM) is better for investors than historical cost accounting (HCA). LCM could
have significantly lower reliability than HCA in that write-down estimations might
be misrepresented intentionally or unintentionally. Reliable accounting numbers
accurately reflect intrinsic values that market participants have assigned. Unreliable
accounting numbers are evidenced by larger residuals in the valuation models,
decreasing model explanatory power.
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4.2.1. Non-nested Model Selection

Both balance sheet and income information are accessible and important to
various market participants in valuing a firm. Therefore, three valuation models will
be used to test the relative reliability, interpreted as model appropriateness in this
section, of HCA and LCM conventions: the balance sheet model, the income
statement model, and the price model.
Estimation equations for the balance sheet models are:
MVEit = φ 0 + φ1 BVA0 it + φ 2 BVLit + φ3 BVAH it + η it

(4)

MVEit = φ ' 0 + φ '1 BVA0 it + φ ' 2 BVLit + φ '3 BVACit + η 'it

(5)

where MVE, BVA0, BVL and BVAH are defined in equation (1). BVAC is reported
amount of assets that are subject to asset write-down regulations. Equation (4) is the
balance sheet model under HCA and equation (5) is the same model yet under LCM.
The only difference between these two equations is that equation (4) drops the
provision item from equation (1) while equation (5) absorbs it into an independent
variable BVAC.
Equations for the income statement models are:
Rit = ϕ 0 + ϕ1 Eith + ϕ 2 ∆Eigh + µ it

(6)

Rit = ϕ ' 0 + ϕ1 ' E itc + ϕ 2 ' ∆E igc + µ 'it

(7)

where R, Eh and ∆Eh are defined in equation (2) and equation (3). Ec and ∆Ec are
reported earnings level and earnings change under LCM. Therefore, equation (6) is a
HCA model, while equation (7) is a LCM model.
Equations (8) and (9) are price models under HCA and LCM respectively:
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MVEit = h 0 + h 1 BVEH it + h 3 Eith + ς it

(8)

MVEit = h' 0 + h'1 BVECit + h'3 Eitc + ς 'it

(9)

Note that the only difference between the two accounting conventions, namely
LCM and HCA, is the amount of asset write-down provisions or related gains and
losses. Because both accounting information from LCM and HCA are relevant to
investors, the more reliable these estimates are, the more appropriate the accounting
convention will be. Therefore, one could argue that an inferior LCM model is due to
unreliable write-down estimates.
Statistically, HCA and LCM models are non-nested. However, they are also not
independent, because they share some values, i.e. some asset variable and liability
variables. They are overlapping, non-nested models, and testing such models is
difficult (see, e.g., Vuoug’s (1989) discussion). Because of the shared variables, it is
often very hard to discriminate between the models. Three approaches will be used in
this study.
The first measure, adjusted R2 comparison, is used extensively in prior papers.
For example, Dechow (1994) tests whether realized cash flow has a higher
association (R2) with stock return than earnings, which is interpreted as more
effectively summarizing firm performance. Similarly, adjusted R2s are compared
between HCA regressions and LCM regressions. The equation with a higher R2 will
be favored. This approach is reasonable for non-overlapping models using the same
dependent variable.
The second measure uses the J test, described, e.g., in Greene (2003 154f), is
based on the “encompassing principle”. In test 1, let H0 (the null) be that HCA is the
correct model, and let H1 (the alternative) be that LCM is the correct model. Obtain
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the fitted values from the LCM model. Add these as independent variables in the
(augmented) HCA model. If the coefficient on the fitted values in the HCA model is
significant, H0 can be rejected—that is, LCM has explanatory power beyond HCA. If
the coefficient is insignificant, H0 is accepted. Because definition of the hypotheses
is arbitrary, the roles of HCA and LCM must be reversed for test 2. There are, in
total, four possibilities for the J test. If both hypotheses are rejected, then neither
model encompasses the other; if both hypotheses are accepted, then the data are not
rich enough to distinguish the models; in the remaining two cases, one model or the
other is superior, in the sense that it encompasses the other.
The third measure, derived from the likelihood ratio test, is the Cox test. The
Cox test is described, e.g., in Greene (2003 155f). The Cox test is based on the
assumption of normally distributed errors in the competing regression models.
Although the procedure is similar to the J test, the Cox test examines the increase in
error variance in the augmented models. Because of its distributional assumptions,
the Cox test is likely to be more powerful than the J test. However, because errors are
only asymptotically normal in the models of this paper, the test is also less robust.
Details of the J and Cox tests are discussed in Appendix B.
4.2.2. Relative Measurement Error Research

Apart from a mixed effect of relevance and reliability, the J and Cox tests could
suffer a mixed effect of measurement errors. It is apparent that all independent
variables contain measurement errors, generating a residual in a regression.
Conclusions of any decreases in reliability recorded in the J test or Cox test could be
a result of an increased variance and covariance structure of measurement errors,
rather than an increased measurement error brought by write-down practice. Relative
measurement error research is an alternative in testing reliability. Only the semi-log
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balance sheet model and the semi-log income statement model are employed in this
section, and I give up the price model because of weak theoretical support. A more
extensive discussion of relative measurement error research is given in Appendix C.
The balance sheet research is based on equations (4) and (5), the same equations
as used for the model appropriateness tests. The main purpose here is to conclude
whether LCM asset values contain less measurement error than HCA asset values,
that is to say, whether BVAC contains smaller measurement error than that of BVAH,
which is the only difference between equation (4) and equation (5). According to the
relative measurement error research, measurement error in BVA0 and BVL also
contributes to regression residuals and coefficient biases, so residual comparison is
not proper if more than one independent variables are involved. Following the
econometric setting outlined in Barth (1991), Choi et al. (1997), and Boone (2002), I
estimate the variances of measurement error, σ2umvah (for BVAH) and σ2umvac (for
BVAC), from an errors-in-variables two-stage regression (Appendix equation A-28).
A larger variance implies a larger measurement error. The variance comparison is
made by an F test in the seemingly unrelated settings.
The two approaches employed in Barth (1991) and Boone (2002) have different
assumptions regarding the variance and covariance structure, which is a critical issue
in relative measurement error research. Boone (2002) argues that the covariances
ignored by Barth (1991) in her computation might weaken her final conclusion.
Boone (2002) specifies a compound statistical procedure beyond that of Barth’s
(Appendix equation A-33). However, the method illustrated in Barth (1991) is direct
and easy to implement (Appendix equation A-31). I employ both tests in this study,
which might generate conflicting results. Consistent results would add credibility to
the conclusion.
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Analogous to the balance sheet model, reported earnings also contain
measurement error. I separate the earnings level (E) and earnings change (∆E) from
both equations (6) and (7) into independent regressors, keeping only one independent
variable each time. Under this setting, the magnitude of measurement error relates
directly to the regression residual. A non-nested test proposed by Vuong (1989), is
used to assess the magnitude of regression residual for earnings level income
statement models and earnings change income statement models under both HCA
and LCM conventions. A positive z-statistic implies that the residuals produced by
the earnings from LCM convention are larger in magnitude than those from HCA
convention. Hence, a positive and significant z-statistic indicates that HCA
convention has less measurement error in terms of earnings level or earnings change.
I discuss the Vuong test in Appendix B.

4.3. Write-down Motivation Analysis
I characterize write-down provisions as discretionary because limited
authoritative guidance provides management with substantial flexibility in
determining amounts of current and accumulated write-down. On the other hand,
assets are also written down for economic reasons, for example, a loss in value.
In exploring attributes of firms which affect the amount of write-downs, I
identify both variables that capture impairment motivations and earnings
manipulation motivations. All variables are calculated with no asset write-down
effect, i.e. any present asset write-down provisions are added back to assets and
related losses are added back to current earnings. A primary motive for asset writedown (and the objective of the regulations) is the impairment of assets. The first
proxy for impairment is market-to-book ratio (MTB). MTB equals market value of
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equity divided by book value of equity, each measured at the fiscal year-end. I expect
that firms with a decreasing MTB ratio (negative ∆MTB) are more likely to
recognize impairment losses because the market has devalued their net assets. As a
result, firms with relatively low MTB ratios should tend to have larger write-down
provisions for economic reasons. Similarly, I predict that the firms with a below
industry-average return on assets ratio (IAROA) are more likely to experience
decreasing asset efficiency, thus they are more likely to record asset write-down.
I also include variables to proxy for factors associated with managements’
incentives to take different amounts of asset write-down. The first such variable is
financial distress (FD). FD is a dummy variable, with a value of one for firms
classified as “ST” or “PT”. FD firms may be motivated either to avoid losses (no or
limited impairment) or to take a big bath (excessive write-down) to avoid
consecutive years of FD. Clearly, the amounts of current write-down are different for
these two purposes. The second dummy variable is the auditor’s opinion (AO). AO
proxies credibility of the financial statements. Auditors normally assign one of five
opinions in China: clean, clean with explanation, qualified, adverse, and disclaimer.
The AO variable is zero for a clean opinion (includes clean with explanation) and
one otherwise. Most commonly, firms receive a clean opinion. Any other opinion
signals reduced confidence in the financial statements on the part of the auditor. A
possible source for this reduced confidence is management’s use of discretionary
asset write-down. The third variable is current year’s earnings performance. On the
one hand, if management is compensated with earnings-based bonus plans, and if
pre-write-down earnings are already short of target, management has an incentive to
shift future write-downs into the current year to improve the chance for future
bonuses. This is a one form of the big bath hypothesis. However, it is common in
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China for management positions to be linked with an earnings-based benchmark, and
gross shortfall of the benchmark may result in dismissal. Managers in such a position
are motivated to avoid huge losses. Facing a large loss, they may try to shift current
write-down to later periods. Facing an adequate profit, on the other hand, they may
increase discretionary accruals. This is one form of the income-smoothing hypothesis.
To capture these varied effects, I define separate dummy variables for each. I define
earnings performance as abnormally good (GOOD) if industry-adjusted ROE is in
the top 10 percentile, measured prior to any current write-down amounts. I define
earnings performance as abnormally poor (POOR) if industry-adjusted ROE is in the
bottom 10 Percentile. The last non-economic dummy variable is TURN, defined as
the possibility to turn profitable by earnings manipulation. Companies with small
losses in the range of zero to negative ¥0.1 per share are classified into this category.
Finally, I include a measure of firm size (SIZE), defined as the log of total
assets per share preceding write-downs. I also include a measure of leverage (LEV),
defined as total liabilities divided by total assets. Size and leverage of the firm are
general control variables. I do not propose any a priori linkage between these
variables and asset write-down, but it is reasonable to assume that the market could
treat write-down differentially based on these fundamental financial characteristics.
The multivariate analysis is performed on the current write-down ratio
(RDIFPROV), defined as the current write-down amount divided by the related
assets subject to write-down (at unadjusted cost), and also on the accumulated writedown ratio (RPROV), defined as the write-down provision divided by the related
assets subject to write-down. The regressions are:
RDIFPROVit = φ 0 + φ1 FDit + φ 2 AOit + φ3 SIZEit + φ 4 LEVit + φ5 ∆MTBit
+ φ 6 IAROAit + φ 7 GOOD + φ8 POORit + φ9TURN it + ξ it
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(10)

RPROVit = ϕ 0 + ϕ1 FDit + ϕ 2 AOit + ϕ 3 SIZEit + ϕ 4 LEVit + ϕ 5 MTBit
+ ϕ 6 IAROAit + ϕ 7 GOOD + ϕ 8 POORit + ϕ 9TURN it + ς it

(11)

5. Sample Selection and Data Description
5.1. Sample Selection
The sample consists of firms listed on the Shanghai Exchange and Shenzhen
Stock Exchange from 1998 to 2001—the period covering the accounting reform and
the related asset write-down regulations.33 Financial data and stock market data are
mainly collected from the TEJ (Taiwan Economy Journal) database. Due to
limitations in this database, additional data are collected from annual statements.
There are 851 listed companies in the whole market in 1998, and this number
increased to 1160 at the end of 2001. Companies were not included in this research
unless they met all the following criteria:
1.

annual earnings, book value, and share information are available on the 2001
Taiwan Economic Journal Database, supplemented by official stock
information obtained from the website of the CSRC;

2.

firms issuing B or H shares are excluded, in order to remove the potential
impact of foreign investors;

3.

the firm is listed before 1997, in order to eliminate any IPO effect;34
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This four-year period also witnessed a prosperous economy in China. For example, the
Shanghai stock market index increased from 1194 in January 1998 to 2230 in June 2001, which is also
its historical high. After that, the market declined and the index has not reached this level again (as of
early 2003).
34

IPO packaging is particularly an issue in China, where the stock market is the most precious
money resource (Aharony, et al. 2000)
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firm financial and market data must be available for each year in the period.

4.

[Table 2 here]
These filters produced a sample of 320 firms that survived through the 4-year
period, forming a balanced panel of 1280 firm-year observations. Panel data make it
possible to control for both cross-sectional and time-series effects, producing more
reliable coefficient estimates.35 Table 2 summarizes sample selection results. Panel A
shows the relative scale of the selected sample by listed locations and share types.
The sample consists of 31.6% of the existing firm-year observations. There are
marginally more firms in Shanghai market than that in Shenzhen market, and cover
percentages in both markets are similar. The sample also covers 36.3% of the A
shares in the whole market. Panel B presents the sample firms by industry. 320 firms
are categorized into 9 main industries according to GICS (Global Industry
Classification Standard). The highest sample intensity is the consumer discretionary
industry, constituting 25.3% of the sample. The financial industry takes up a
percentage of 10.3%, all being real estate companies and not banks.
Table 3 presents evidence on industry differences in asset write-down practice.
The number of industries is reduced to seven after merging some industries.36 PROV
is accumulated write-down ratio and equals the provision scaled by the related asset
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This is one of the many reasons that panel data models are popular in accounting research. A
pooled regression in this study without any year or firm controls may not provide precise estimations,
while a fixed effects or a random effects pooled regression may. The fixed effects regression model
corrects the omitted variable problem in an uncontrolled regression by incorporating firm-specific
and/or year-specific effects. The disadvantage of fixed effects regression is that the model contains a
large number of constant terms. The random effects regression model disaggregates the random error
term in an ordinary pooled regression into firm-specific and/or year-specific components thus
avoiding numerous constant terms. The sample in this paper does not represent a random sample of
listed firms, and, thus, a priori, I would expect the fixed effects to be more appropriate. Nevertheless,
because the random effects model is more parsimonious, it was considered (and rejected ) for this
research (see Appendix A for details).
36

I combine the energy industry with the basic material industry and the consumer staple industry
with the consumer discretionary industry.
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value before write-down. ∆PROV is current write-down amount scaled by the related
asset value. Both PROV and ∆PROV are presented with their four-year-average
values. Seven assets are displayed horizontally and eight industries vertically.
Because asset write-down is not large relative to asset value, the mean and median
ratios for both PROV and ∆PROV are small. Both means and medians for the
accounts receivable provision (PROV1) are well over 1% for all industries except
utilities and are much larger than those for intangible assets (PROV5), construction
in progress (PROV6), and commission loans (PROV7), which are recently required
in AR2001. The means and medians in ∆PROV have the same pattern. The summary
column for PROV (TOTAL PROV) shows that industry 1 (Oil, Gas and Material)
and industry 7 (Utilities) have relatively low accumulated write-down provision
ratios. These two industries are characterized by higher quality (i.e. low risk) assets.
Industry 5 (Financial), on the other hand, has relatively high ratios for PROV, which
may be due to lower quality (i.e. higher risk) assets, such as investments in real estate
development and consumer loans. The summary column for ∆PROV (TOTAL
∆PROV) shows that average current write-down ratio is high in industry 4 (Health
Care) and industry 6 (Information Technology). It is possible that negative writedown amounts are offset by positive write-backs in industry 5 (Financial), because
the current write-down ratio is lower than expected. This could indicate manipulation
of the financial result. The last column presents mean total assets for these industries.
Utility firms are relatively big (¥2697 million) while information technology firms
are the smallest (¥999 million). The absolute amount of total assets probably
suggests asset quality because utilities is the biggest, but least impaired, industry.
[Table 3 here]
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5.2. Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for the value-relevance regression variables are given in
Table 4. To control for the effects of extreme values, each variable is ranked
separately and winsorized by 1% on both ends. This maintains sample size while
minimizing the impact of extreme values. Smaller variances are observed in the
winsorized annual data descriptions (not reported in Table 4) with modest changes in
mean values, which suggests that the influence of extreme values has been
effectively reduced. 37 Both the original numbers and the winsorized numbers are
reported in table 4. The following analysis is based on the winsorized data.
[Table 4 here]
The average per share market value of equity (MVE) is ¥10.92, with an annual
mean standard deviation of ¥2.77. Investors obtained an average annual 25.2% total
market return during this four-year period with an annual mean standard deviation of
43.7%. These two descriptions exhibit a quite unsettled market in China. For the
balance sheet amounts, the asset write-down provision (PROV) achieves a mean of
¥0.176 per share with a standard deviation of ¥0.119, roughly a 4.9% reduction in the
related assets. 38 The provision creates differences between HCA and LCM asset
valuations. For the gain and loss amounts, the mean of annual earnings per share
before asset write-down (Eh ) is ¥0.110 and declines during the period, with the mean
of average earning change (∆Eh ) being –¥0.025. The asset write-down practice
results in a ¥0.025 per share loss (WDGL) and makes LCM earnings (Ec) lower than
HCA earnings (Eh). However, there are write-down gains (WDGL) if managers
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The variances reported in Table 4 are variances of annual mean statistics and thus are not
subject to the variance-minimizing effect of the winsorizing procedure.
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I record PROV in positive numbers.
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revise their earlier estimations and take the provisions back. The result is that LCM
could generate higher earnings. The deteriorating profitability of these firms further
strengthens arguments that Chinese listed companies are “over-dressed” when
initially listed.

6. Empirical Results
6.1. Explanatory power of write-down provisions and related gains and
losses
Table 5 presents regression summary of equation (1). The balance sheet model
is in semi-log form with equity market value (MVE) being in log form.39 Panel A
reports statistics from two fixed effects regressions. The first row reports results of
the four-year fixed effects regression, including 1998, the voluntary write-down year.
The adjusted R-square is 70.0% and all the coefficients estimated are significant at
the 0.05 level except the coefficient on book value of liabilities (BVL). The
coefficient for asset write-down provisions is –0.275 (t= -7.092) and much more
significant than that for other assets. The three-year fixed effects regression results
are reported below, where I drop the year 1998 to investigate the pure effect of
mandatory write-down. The regression shows a 68.10% adjusted R-square, almost
unchanged from the 4-year fixed effect model despite losing 320 observations. All
the estimates are significant at the 0.05 level and the coefficient for asset write-down
provisions is –0.214 (t= -4.426), which is the most significant. The evidence is clear
that the asset write-down provision has incremental power in the balance sheet model.
However, the coefficients for asset write-down provisions are much bigger than
those for assets and liabilities, which is unexpected. Recalling that coefficients in the
39

Semi-log transformation is used to counter the effect from model misspecification. All
valuation models are in their semi-log forms in this study. Please see Appendix A, part 2 for details.
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semi-log model are partial elasticities, the -0.275 coefficient on provisions in the
four-year model means that a ¥1 per share increase in provisions reduces per share
market equity by 27.5 percent. A similar increase in other liabilities reduces per share
market equity by only 3.3 percent (8.0 percent in the three-year model).
[Table 5 here]
Panel B of Table 5 presents the annual regression estimates for equation (1).
The explanatory power of the annual regressions is relatively low.40 The adjusted Rsquare in the 1999 regression is only 1.5%. This may be a reflection of the
uncertainty introduced by the onset of mandatory write-downs. There is an
insignificantly positive coefficient, α4, for PROV in 1998 while the coefficients
subsequently turn negative. This suggests that some investors treated voluntary asset
write-down as a good news signal—either of the quality of management or of the
possibility for increased future earnings. α4 turns negative in 1999 and becomes
significantly negative thereafter. With fixed firms in my panel sample, the annual
results for the coefficient on provisions suggest the possibility of some learning
effect by investors or delayed market response. After four years of experience with
the provisions, investors act as if they believe provisions are bad news.
The findings from Table 5 indicate that the write-down provisions are valuerelevant to investors, and these provisions provide more information content to
investors than other assets and liabilities. Value-relevance, however, does not imply
more efficient pricing. Value-relevance could be achieved at the cost of decreased
reliability. The result, therefore, should be treated as tentative.
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The lack of power of the annual regressions reflects the volatility of the Chinese market and the
effects of accounting reforms during this period. The panel regression overcomes much of this
volatility by estimating annual effects.
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Table 6 presents regression summaries of equation (2), the semi-log form of
income statement model. Panel A reports the estimates from fixed effects regressions
and Panel B reports annual ones. First I report the four-year fixed effects regression.
The adjusted R-square is 55.6%, which is quite powerful for an income statement
model. Consistent with Easton et al. (1993), significantly positive coefficients are
recorded on both earnings level (Eh) and earnings change (△Eh) variables. However,
the coefficient for write-down gains and losses (WDGL) is –0.420 (t= -0.819), which
is not significant at the conventional level and suggests a transitory loss. The threeyear fixed effect regression yields similar results except for a higher adjusted Rsquare and a significantly negative WDGL coefficient. The magnitude of the WDGL
coefficient, however, is lower than that on earnings level. A possible explanation is
that these write-down losses might not be as permanent as other gains or losses
generated from operations and thus are capitalized at a lower rate. Generally
speaking, the mandatory write-down regression yields evidence that WDGL is valuerelevant in the income statement model.
[Table 6 here]
Panel B of Table 6 presents annual regression estimates for equation (2). The
explanatory power of the annual regressions is relatively low compared with that in
the fixed effect regressions, but is, even with fewer independent variables, somewhat
better than those in the annual balance sheet model regressions, indicating the
possibility that the Chinese equity market is more “earnings-driven” than “assetsdriven”. Earnings change variables are significant in 3 years while those for level are
significant in 2 years. I record a significantly positive coefficient for WDGL in 1998
while all are negative in following periods, which suggests that some voluntary
write-down practices are actually signals conveying good news to the investors. For
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example, the management could demonstrate their conservatism to lenders by
devaluing assets and reducing earnings. Together with the result from the balance
sheet model, there is evidence that the market is rewarding the early adopters or
equivalently, punishing firms who hide losses by not reporting asset impairments.
The mandatory regulations, however, causes write-down practices to become routine
and diminishes the signaling effect of WDGL, as we see from the increasing
permanence in WDGL.
The findings from Table 6 indicate that write-down practice is value-relevant to
investors in terms of its gains and losses, but the information content of write-downs
is lower than that of HCA earnings. Again I find that the effect of voluntary writedown practice 1998 is different from that of mandatory write-down in later years,
which is subject to less discretion. The noise in these gains and losses could lead
them to be viewed as transitory, as can be observed from their small coefficients.
Retrospective adjustments taken in 1999 and 2001 are especially likely to contain
measurement error. Therefore, the unreliability of these write-down gains and losses
could offset their relevance.
[Table 7 here]
Table 7 represents the regression results from the semi-log form of price model,
which captures information from both balance sheets and income statements. Panel
A reports the combined assets and earnings outcome in the fixed effects regressions.
The explanatory power of the price model is higher than either the balance sheet
model or the income statement model, related R-squares are 73.4% for the four-year
regression and 70.8% for the three-year regression. Coefficients on earnings level (Eh)
in both regressions are positive and the ones on write-down gains and losses (WDGL)
are negative, with the latter variables being less significant. These results are similar
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to those in income statement models. I am surprised in finding insignificant
coefficients for book value of net asset (BVEH) and write-down provision (PROV)
in these fixed effect regressions. Income statement information is clearly dominating
balance sheet information in market valuation in China. Panel B of Table 7 shows
that coefficients on earnings are all significant with the predicted signs, while the
coefficients on provisions are insignificant or only marginally significant. The
marginally significant coefficient is positive, implying an increase in market equity if
provisions increase—a counter-intuitive result. A high level of provisions may have
been associated with higher expected future return on assets. But the association is
not too strong and did not persist in subsequent periods.
The price model tests give a weighted test for write-down provisions and related
gains and losses together. The results show evidence that write-down gains and
losses are incrementally value-relevant while the write-down provisions are
insignificantly value-relevant. These results, however, do not suggest that the
provisions are not value-relevant. Instead, it points up that the earnings information
might be more important in the valuation processes.
In general, the results presented in 6.1 show evidence that asset write-down
practice is value-relevant, providing incremental information beyond historical
numbers. The voluntary write down imposes different effects on its value-relevance
due to either learning effects or signal effects. However, it does not change the
overall results when the observations are pooled. Finally, earnings have priority over
assets in valuation processes. In the light of the relevance and reliability theory, asset
write-down accounting, although relevant, could cause decreased reliability. The
next part of paper is devoted to the reliability analysis.
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6.2. The Reliability of Write-down Provisions and Related Gains and
Losses
Table 8 reports comparative results based on three valuation models. All these
tests are based on the semi-log fixed effects panel regressions. Panel A shows results
from the balance sheet model. HCA model, equation (4) and LCM model, equation
(5) are regressed independently. LCM model generates marginally higher adjusted Rsquares in both fixed effects regressions, with the difference less than 1 percent. In
the four-year regression, the J test rejects both null hypotheses in test 1 (t=5.978) and
test 2 (t=-4.290), the Cox test rejects both also (t=-30.156 for test 1 and t=9.288 for
test 2). However, test 1 generates more significant t values in both J and Cox tests,
rejecting the null hypothesis that HCA is appropriate more strongly. The three-year
regression shows similar ambiguous results (t=-15.451 for test 1 and t=5.134 for test
2) in the Cox test. The J test, however, rejects HCA but does not reject LCM
(t=3.864 for test 1 and t=-1.916 for test 2), indicating that LCM is the appropriate
model. In sum, results are ambiguous in balance sheet comparisons: weak evidence
is shown that the LCM is more appropriate in the four-year period which includes the
voluntary write-down year 1998; these results, however, show stronger, but not
conclusive, evidence that LCM is more appropriate in the three-year mandatory
write-down period.
[Table 8 here]
Panel B of Table 8 reports results from the income statement model. Both
equations, equation (6) and equation (7), are regressed independently. LCM model
generates marginally smaller adjusted R-squares in both fixed effects regressions,
with the difference less than 1 percent. Both J test and Cox test reject the null
hypotheses in test 2 and accept the null hypotheses in test 1 in the four-year
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regression, significantly indicating that HCA is appropriate in this setting. Results are
ambiguous in the three-year regression, where the J test and Cox test generate close t
values for both test 1 and test 2 (for J, t=2.388 for test 1 and t=2.717 for test 2; for
Cox, t=-3.919 for test 1 and t=-4.648 for test 2). However, test 2 yields larger t
values. In sum, the income statement model comparisons show strong evidence that
HCA is more appropriate in the four-year period. In the three-year mandatory writedown period, however, the models are essentially comparable.
Panel C of Table 8 reports marginally higher R-squares in LCM regressions.
The J test and Cox test reject the null of both tests in both regressions. In all cases,
the HCA model can be rejected at a lower level than LCM model, with rather larger
differences in the three-year regressions. In sum, results here provide weak evidence
in favor of LCM. This is perhaps somewhat surprising given the results for the
income statement model and given that earnings dominated equity in the price model.
Model appropriateness tests, in brief, show some evidence that balance sheet
amounts are more reliable under LCM convention, especially after the enforcement
of mandatory regulations. The tests, however, show modest evidence that earnings
amounts are less reliable under LCM convention, and it is clear that the voluntary
write-down brings unreliable estimates into earnings amounts. If both assets and
earnings are considered, the results are ambiguous but still there is weak evidence
that the LCM convention is more reliable.
Table 9 reports additional reliability evidence from the relative measurement
error research. Panel A shows the relative magnitudes of measurement error
variances for BVAC after subtracting the measurement error variances for BVAH.
The Barth (1991) approach generates significant positive values in both four-year
and three-year regression, indicating bigger measurement error variances under the
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LCM convention. A bigger measurement error variance, in term, indicates a larger
measurement error. The Boone (2002) approach also generates significant positive
values in both regressions, showing that the LCM convention contains no less
measurement error than the HCA convention. Panel B of Table 9 shows reliability
evidence from income statement models. None of the z values are significant, but the
direction of the values favors LCM in the mandatory write-down period and HCA in
the four-year period.
[Table 9 here]
In general, the reliability tests present ambiguous evidence as to whether the
write-down practice has improved the reliability of accounting information or not.
The non-nested approach shows weak evidence that LCM contains less measurement
error in the balance sheet, while the relative measurement error test comes to an
opposite conclusion. Most likely, the magnitude of measurement error in the balance
sheet remains unchanged after write-down. There is stronger evidence that voluntary
write-down practice brings more measurement error with respects to earnings, which
is supported in both non-nested and relative measurement error tests. This earnings
effect, however, is not clear in the mandatory period.

6.3. Write-down Motivation Analysis
Panel A of table 10 reports mean and standard deviation values for the variables
in equations (10) and (11). The mean for firm size (SIZE) is 1.40, which is the log
form of per share total assets. The mean for leverage is 48.5%. The sample firms
have an average market-to-book ratio (MTB) of 5.48, with a 0.32 increase (∆MTB)
in sample period. A standard deviation of 7.95, however, suggests the market’s
unsettled situation. 7.7% of the total sample firms receive qualified auditor’s
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opinions (AO) and 5.2% have experienced financial distress (FD). As to their
performance, the average industry-adjusted return on assets (IAROA) is 0.0% by
construction (mean-adjusted value). Also by construction, 10% of the sample firms
are in the good performance portfolio (GOOD), and another 10% are in the poor
performance portfolio (BAD). 6.8% of the firms have marginal losses (TURN).
Finally, the description reports an average 1.8% current write-down ratio (RDIF) and
an average 4.5% accumulated write-down ratio (RPROV). Panel B presents the
correlation matrix for the regression variables. None of the variables are highly
correlated with each other in either Spearman or Pearson tests. The strongest relation
is that between LEV and SIZE (0.43).
[Table 10 here]
The multivariate analysis for equation (10) is shown in panel C, which presents
numerical relations between different motivations and present asset write-down
ratios. The pooled sample regressions show R-squares of 14.6% and 13.9% for the
four-year sample and three-year sample respectively. The proxy for impairment
motivation, △MTB, has significant negative coefficients in both four-year and threeyear regressions, supporting my prediction that firms with declining market-to-book
ratio incur more current write-down. Another proxy in this category, IAROA, also
has significant negative coefficients in both regressions. It suggests that belowaverage IAROA can also trigger write-downs. Proxies for discretionary motivations
are all significant in both regressions except for POOR. The positive coefficients for
AO suggest that current write-down amounts have a positive relation with the
incidence of qualified auditor’s opinions, which partially represent the quality of
financial reports. This in turn suggests that large amounts of current write-down
might contain some discretionary motivations. The negative coefficients for FD
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suggest that firms write down less if they are in financial distress. The good
performance portfolio (GOOD) yields significantly positive coefficients in both
regressions, supporting the possibilities of income-smoothing. The poor performance
portfolio, however, does not show any relation with current write-down amounts. A
possible explanation is that some firms with severe losses take big baths while others
minimize their deficits, diversified strategies leading to an insignificant result on the
whole. As expected, the TURN variable yields significantly negative coefficients in
both regressions, showing management motivation to avoid write-down losses or to
record write-back gains when the firm result, before write-down, is a modest loss.
The control variable LEV is significantly positive in both regressions while the
control variable SIZE is not significant. These results suggest that high leverage is
associated with high current write-down, which is contrary to conventional
contracting theory. The annual regression results, listed in the right columns, report
few significant variables because the motivations are better captured in a relatively
long period rather than in a year. The AO, GOOD and TURN variables are
significant in most of the annual regressions with the predicted signs, exhibiting
strong discretionary motivations in current write-down amounts. The POOR variable,
however, shows different signs among the four years, reflecting the diversified
strategies among the poor performance portfolio.
The current write-down ratio measures annual effects. Panel D of Table 10
presents the multivariate analysis for accumulated write-down provisions ratios. The
accumulated write-down ratio captures multi-period effects. Both three-year and
four-year fixed effect regressions yield high adjusted R-squares of 63.11% and
72.32%, respectively. The panel reveals some results that are interesting vis-à-vis the
results in panel C for the current write-down ratio. In particular, the result for FD is
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significantly positive compared to a significantly negative result for current writedowns. The result suggests that FD (like GOOD firms) engage in smoothing of their
write-down losses, but they do not avoid large provisions over the test period. GOOD,
on the other hand, is significantly negative compared to a significantly positive result
for current write-downs. The result suggests that good firms engage in smoothing
only infrequently, but that they do not (or cannot) build up large provisions. The sign
on the coefficient for POOR is positive and opposite that of its sign for current writedowns, paralleling the behavior of the GOOD variable. But the coefficient remains
insignificant. This is somewhat surprising, because both big bath and smoothing
strategies for POOR firms should lead to higher provisions. The result suggests that
POOR firms have been successful in avoiding cumulatively large write-downs over
the test period. The TURN variable remains significantly negative. This is even
stronger evidence that some firms with poor performance have avoided cumulatively
large write-downs. These results could be a point of concern for regulators in the
Chinese market. The control variable LEV yields a similar result as it does in the
previous regression. SIZE goes from insignificantly negative for current write-downs
to significantly negative for accumulated write-down provisions, indicating that these
firms have persistently low write-downs. The largest firms in the sample are utilities
with relatively high-quality assets. However, utilities are only 5 percent of the
sample. It is possible that firm size and asset quality are positively related in other
industries in China. But the result raises the possibility that large firms have more
political power and use that power to avoid large write-downs.
In general, the empirical evidence presented above supports my prediction that
both impairment motivations and discretionary motivations can lead to asset writedown, currently and cumulatively. Stronger relations are found between asset write-
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down practice and discretionary motivations. Over and under provisions are related
with the diversified goals of earnings management. There is evidence that large firms
and poorly performing firms are able to avoid large provisions.

7. Further Analysis
Some professional papers attack the practice of periodically excessive writedowns, which they consider unethical.41 An excessive write-down could either be a
result of unexpected asset impairment or be a convenient way to manipulate earnings.
Many recent accounting scandals in China involve excessive asset write-down or
excessive asset “write-up”. 42 This section provides tests for the hypotheses that
excessive asset write-down might involve discretionary manipulations and thereby
reduce the reliability of LCM values.
I begin by estimating the degree of asset write-down (including write-back),
using the absolute amounts of asset write-down ratios.43 I rank these ratios annually
and pick out the top 20% firms as excessive write-down firms. Excessive write-down
can have multiple year effects on a firm’s performance; for example, a large writedown can reduce losses for several subsequent years. Therefore, firms are
categorized into the excessive write-down sample (HIGH) if they take an excessive
write-down at least once in the sample period. Otherwise, they are classified as
normal write-down firms (LOW).
[Table 11 here]
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Case study: Shanxi Fenjiu (listed code 600809), decreasing bad debt allowances and increasing
earnings. China Securities (12/04/2001).
42

Write-up here means taking back the provisions and recovering the impaired assets.

43

Asset write-back ratio is negative. After taking absolute value, this ratio becomes positive.
51

Table 11 reports the descriptive statistics for both HIGH sample and LOW
sample. Panel A reports the composition of the HIGH sample. 166 firms are picked
as the aggressive firms that write down assets excessively, leaving 154 firms in the
opposite sample. Particularly, 70.6% of the information technology firms are in the
HIGH sample while the ratio is only 20.0% for utilities firms, which is attributed to
different industry characteristics: a conservative industry like utilities seldom adopts
aggressive accounting policies while a liberal industry like IT often adopts
aggressive policies. A two-way chi-squared statistic (14.52) rejects the hypothesis
that HIGH sample firms are evenly distributed among industries.
Panel B of Table 11 presents the descriptive statistics of the two sub-samples. I
use the t test of means and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test of medians to assess
statistical differences between the HIGH sample firms and LOW sample firms,
where firm performance, discretionary motivations and other controlling factors are
compared. Because the underlying distributions of the variables are not normal, the
Wilcoxon test may be more powerful than the t test. The accumulated provision ratio
(RPROV) shows statistical differences in mean and median with a t value of –15.078
and a z value of –14.150. This shows that the behavior of excessive write-down
generally results in relatively more provisions in the accounts. Next, I find that these
two sub-samples have significantly different ROA, IAROA and MTB ratios. The
HIGH sample firms have smaller ROAs as well IAROAs while achieving larger
MTB ratios. Lower IAROA implies under-performing assets for HIGH firms. Such
assets are more likely to be impaired. This result supports non-discretionary
motivation for write-downs. On the contrary, significantly higher MTB ratios as well
as insignificantly higher ∆MTB in the HIGH sample present controversial evidence
against the economic motivation hypothesis. Under the economic motivation, it
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should be the LOW sample which has lower MTB ratios and experiences greater
declines in MTB. The adjusted return (R) is not significantly different between the
two sub-samples, although returns to LOW firms are higher than those to HIGH
firms. This again supports non-discretionary motivations for write-down; otherwise,
investors could discriminate between these sub-samples in terms of risk. Although
HIGH and LOW firms are not significantly different in size, they do differ in
leverage. HIGH firms are significantly more levered than LOW firms. The results of
Table 10 already show that leverage is significantly positively associated with writedowns, both current and cumulative. High leverage firms may be subject to more
scrutiny by their creditors (outsiders) than low leverage firms.
Discretionary motivations, however, are more pronounced. The mean and
median tests show significant values for all the discretionary-motivation variables.
The HIGH sample firms are 4 times more likely to receive qualified auditor’s
opinions and 6 times more likely to experience financial distress. Also, the likelihood
for their presence in the POOR and TURN portfolios is much higher than those for
the LOW sample firms. On the contrary, HIGH sample firms are less likely to
achieve GOOD status as one of the top 10 percent performers in any year.44
In sum, the descriptive statistics show evidence that “excessive” asset writedown is related to both asset impairment and to discretionary motivations. One
revealing aspect is that the excessive write-down practice exhibits more discretionary
motivations that may involve earnings manipulation.
[Table 12 here]

44

Although I record a positive relation between current write-down ratio and GOOD in Table 10,
this relation was negative for the accumulated write-down ratio, indicating that GOOD firms
accumulated relatively low provisions. Excessive write-down firms are in the top 20 percent of writedowns in at least 1 year, and it is likely that GOOD firms never record such high annual write-downs.
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Table 12 presents the non-nested model selection results for the two subsamples, HIGH and LOW. Panel A presents the results from the balance sheet model
comparisons. Neither J nor Cox tests can distinguish the two accounting conventions
in the LOW sample, where the write-down amounts are normal. Both test 1 and test 2
either jointly reject or jointly accept, leaving an ambiguous result. For the HIGH
sample, however, the qualitative results favor the LCM model for both Cox and J
tests. In the three-year period model, the J test rejects the null in test 1 and does not
reject in test 2, supporting LCM as the appropriate model in the three-year period.
Together with other evidence such as marginally improved R-squares, the LCM
model shows a slight priority over HCA in terms of reliability.
Panel B of Table 12 presents the results from the income statement model
comparisons. The LOW sample sees a small improvement in the R-squares under
write-down accounting. Moreover, the null hypothesis that HCA is appropriate is
rejected in both J and Cox tests in both regressions, while in the symmetric test the
null hypothesis that LCM is appropriate is not rejected in both J and Cox tests in both
regressions. Evidence is clear that LCM improves the reliability in the LOW sample.
The HIGH sample reports different results for the four- and three-year models. The
results tend to favor HCA for the four-year model, but LCM for the three-year model.
There is weak evidence that mandatory asset write-down could improve the
reliability of earnings information while the voluntary write-down, on the contrary,
obviously decreases reliability.
Panel C of Table 12 tests the of the price model, which includes both assets and
earnings. As previously seen in Table 7, net earnings dominate net assets in this
model. Because of this, the price model can be expected to yield similar results to
those reported in panel B. The J test and Cox test strongly support the claim that
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LCM is more appropriate in the LOW sample. The results are ambiguous in HIGH
sample apparently due to the possible unreliability of voluntary write-down in the
first year of the period. Nevertheless, the results qualitatively support LCM even for
the HIGH sample. In the three-year model, the J test rejects HCA but cannot reject
LCM as the appropriate model.
Additional reliability tests using the relative measurement error approach shows
growing dichotomy between the two sub-samples. Panel A of Table 13 reports the
measurement error tests for both LOW and HIGH sample. Both Barth (1991) and
Boone (2002) approaches generate significant negative values, which are strong
evidence that LCM contains less measurement error than HCA. The HIGH sample
reports significant positive values under both approaches, indicating a possible
increased measurement error in LCM convention. Results from four-year and threeyear regressions are consistent. Note that the non-nested test favors LCM slightly in
HIGH sample, which is contrary to the result found here. The difference may come
from different assumptions on which non-nested and relative measurement error tests
are built. Nevertheless, both results in the HIGH sample are not conclusive, which
implies that the measurement error or reliability could remain unchanged in the
HIGH sample. Panel B reports the measurement error tests from the income
statement models. The LOW sample experiences a small improvement in terms of
reliability, as suggested by the negative Vuong’s z values. This improvement,
however, is not statistically significant. Although the HIGH sample also reports
insignificant negative z values in the four-year regression, it reports insignificant
positive z values in the three-year regression, which show qualitative evidence that
voluntary write-down can bring more measurement error in earnings. This finding is
consistent with the results from J and Cox tests.
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[Table 13 here]
In general, the sub-sample reliability analysis shows that periodically excessive
write-down may reduce the reliability of earnings information, especially in the
voluntary write-down period. Conversely, non-aggressive write-down practice,
which involves less discretionary motivation, appears to increase the reliability of
financial information in both assets and earnings. Evidence of decreased reliability in
excessive write-down sample, however, is not significant, which suggests some
effect from non-discretionary motivations.

8. Conclusion
The objectives of this study are to identify value-relevance characteristics of
asset write-down regulations enforced in the recent accounting reform. Both
reliability and motivation issues are empirically investigated in this study. There are
in total 320 Chinese exchange-listed companies covering a four-year research period
(1998-2001) in the sample.
The study shows that provisions and associated gains and losses of asset writedown accounting are priced by the stock market. This result is consistent with the
findings of prior value-relevance research. The study also shows that voluntary
write-down practice may contain either signaling or learning effects, leading to a
value-relevance effect that is opposite that of mandatory write-down practice.
It is possible that LCM numbers, although value-relevant, are measured with
greater error than HCA numbers, leading to a loss of reliability. This possibility is
investigated using non-nested model comparisons (J and Cox tests) together with
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relative measurement error tests. Results for the balance sheet model qualitatively
support LCM as the better model in the J and Cox tests, while the relative
measurement error tests show that LCM contains no less measurement error than that
from HCA. Results from both approaches for the income statement model
qualitatively support HCA as the better model. In particular, HCA is weakly
supported as the superior model for the four-year period including the voluntary
write-down year of 1998. In the price model (which combines return and asset
variables), the results from J and Cox tests qualitatively support LCM. There is
evidence that voluntary LCM practice decreased reliability of reported earnings, but
there is no evidence that mandatory LCM practice has decreased reliability of net
earnings or net assets in China.
A potential source of lack of reliability in the LCM numbers is discretionary
motivation. Results show that the asset write-down amounts are associated with
some discretionary motivations. But the results also show positive association with
proxies for asset impairment, supporting non-discretionary motivation for writedown. To further investigate the possible effect of discretionary motivation on
reliability of the LCM numbers, I partition the sample based on the magnitude of
write-downs, categorizing firms with excessive write-downs or write-backs into one
sample (HIGH) and the rest into the other (LOW). The t and Wilcoxon sign-rank
tests show that write-down abuse is related to discretionary motivations. For the low
write-down/write-back sample, J and Cox tests show that LCM is superior for both
the return and price model with mixed results for the balance sheet model. With the
same sample, the relative measurement error tests report significantly less
measurement error for LCM than that for HCA. Results for the high writedown/write-back sample are generally mixed, indicating that no improvement in
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accounting reliability has been achieved in LCM. The fact that HCA is not
unambiguously selected as the superior model for the high sample implies that nondiscretionary motivations are still an important element of large write-downs/writebacks. Nevertheless, the results support the notion that LCM improves reliability of
financial information in the absence of discretionary motivations.
The results in this study have implications for accounting research and practice.
The evidence here contributes to the ongoing debate on the usefulness of the asset
write-down regulations. Results drawn in this study support the accounting reform.
Asset write-down regulations provide more relevant information to investors. If
properly used, these regulations can boost reliability of accounting information and
thus provide more useful accounting information to investors. Regulators should
consider more explicit guidelines to reduce unbiased measurement error and to
strengthen the independent auditor’s position in opposing biased measurement error.
Regulators may also consider incorporating rules prohibiting excessive write-downs.
There are several limitations in this study. First, only 320 firms are covered in
the four-year period. The firms represent the “survivors” over the 1998-2001 period.
Although this introduces possible survivorship bias in the sample, balancing the
panel increases the robustness of the regression models. Furthermore, the use of
survivors makes it possible to abstract from heterogeneous effects such as IPO and
bankruptcy or de-listing. Nevertheless, it should be possible to increase sample size
in future studies.
Second, this study uses relatively simple valuation models that do not fully
capture information available in the market. The original models suffer from
defective specifications, for example, non-normal residuals. Future work could
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examine the value-relevance issue as well as reliability issues using valuation models
that are richer and better specified, either empirically or theoretically.
Finally, this study makes an effort in dealing with relevance and reliability
issues separately from traditional value-relevance research. Reliability is defined as
the difference between intrinsic market value and reported accounting value, known
as measurement error. Two approaches were used in testing the magnitude of
measurement error: model appropriateness test and relative measurement error test.
This study, however, does not fully capture the characteristics of relevance and
reliability. Reliability, for example, could be explained from other perspectives than
measurement. Even if reliability is well defined in this study, the power of the
reliability tests is restricted due to their inherent limitations. Analyses exploring other
interpretations of relevance or reliability would add to deeper understanding of
usefulness of financial statements to investors, regulators as well as academic
researchers.
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TABLES
Table 1
Write-downs Regulations Framework in China

Asset

Impairment Method

Identification of Fair Value

Loss Is Charged To

Regulation

Accounts Receivablea

LCMb

Recoverable Amountc

Administration Expense

AR1998 AR2001

Short-term Investment

LCM

Market Value

Investment Gain or Lossd

AR1998 AR2001

Long-term Investment

LCM

Recoverable Amount

Investment Gain or Loss

AR1998 AR2001

Inventory

LCM

Net Selling Price

Administration Expense

AR1998 AR2001

Fix Asset

LCM

Recoverable Amount

Non-operating Expensed

AR2001

Intangible Asset

LCM

Recoverable Amount

Non-operating Expense

AR2001

Construction In Progress

LCM

Recoverable Amount

Non-operating Expense

AR2001

Commission Loan

LCM

Recoverable Amount

Investment Gain or Loss

AR2001

Notes:
a
b
c
d

Including Other Accounts Receivable
Lower of historical cost or fair market value
Recoverable Amount is the higher of the Net Selling Price (NSP) and its value in use (VIU)
Affects non-operating result
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Table 2
Sample Selection
Panel A: Comparisons Between Full Sample and Selected Sample

1998
1999
2000
2001

Full Sample
Shanghai Shenzhen
438
413
484
465
572
516
646
514

Total
851
949
1088
1160

Listing Location
Selected Sample
Shanghai Shenzhen
184
136
184
136
184
136
184
136

Total
320
320
320
320

Percentage (Selected / Full)
Shanghai Shenzhen
Total
42.01%
32.93%
37.60%
38.02%
29.25%
33.72%
32.17%
26.36%
29.41%
28.48%
26.46%
27.59%

Share Type
a

1998
1999
2000
2001

A
727
822
955
1023

Full Sample
A&
H
A&B
80
18
82
19
86
19
88
25

B
26
26
28
24

Total
851
949
1088
1160

A
320
320
320
320

Selected Sample
Other
Shares
percentage
44.02%
0
38.93%
0
33.51%
0
31.28%
0

Panel B: Selected Sample Firms by Industriesc
Industry by GICSb
N
%
Energy
5
1.56%
Materials
48
15.00%
Industrials
63
19.69%
Consumer Discretionary
81
25.31%
Consumer Staples
11
3.44%
Health Care
30
9.38%
Financials
33
10.31%
Information Technology
34
10.63%
Utilities
15
4.69%
Sum
320
100.00%
Notes:
a A stands for the companies issuing A shares only; A & B stands for the companies issuing
both A and B shares; A & H stands for the companies issuing both A and H shares; B stands for
the companies issuing B shares only.
b According to the GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard), Sector (10) Energy includes (1010) Energy;
Sector (15) Materials includes (1510) Materials; Sector (20) Industrials includes (2010) Capital Goods,(2020)
Commercial Service & Supplies, (2030) Transportation; Sector (25) Consumer Discretionary includes
(2510) Automobile & Components, (2520) Consumer Durables & Apparel, (2530) Hostels, Restaurants & Leisure,
(2540) Media, (2550) Retailing; Sector (30) Consumer Staples includes (3010) Food & Staples Retailing,
(3020) Food, Beverage & Tobacco, (3030) Household & Personal Products; Sector (35) Health Care includes
(3510) Health Care Equipment & Services, (3520) Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology; Sector (40) Financials
includes (4010) Banks, (4020) Diversified Financials, (4030) Insurance, (4040) Real Estate;
Sector (45) Information Technology includes (4510) Software & Services, (4520) Technology Hardware & Equipment,
(4530) Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment; Sector (50) Telecommunication Services includes
(5010) Telecommunication Services; Sector (55) Utilities includes (5510) Utilities;
c Companies are categorized by their main business disclosed publicly. It is assumed that the main business
does not change during the research period. However, it is possible that some companies change business
after merges or acquisitions. The number of the companies who changed their main business during the
research period is small.
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percentage
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

Table3
Summary of Asset Write-down Provisions of Different Industries Within Selected Sample: 1998-2001
GICSa
1

Mean
Medianb

Prov1c
0.0299
0.0136

Prov2
0.0054
0.0007

Prov3
0.0034
0.0000

Prov4
0.0136
0.0000

Prov5
0.0003
0.0000

Prov6
0.0004
0.0000

Prov7 Total Prov
0.0000
0.0582
0.0000
0.0310

∆Prov1
0.0088
0.0007

∆Prov2
0.0020
0.0000

∆Prov3
0.0014
0.0000

∆Prov4
0.0076
0.0000

∆Prov5
0.0003
0.0000

∆Prov6
0.0004
0.0000

∆Prov7 ∆Total Prov
0.0000
0.0221
0.0000
0.0039

2

Mean
Median

0.0593
0.0177

0.0129
0.0013

0.0087
0.0000

0.0110
0.0000

0.0003
0.0000

0.0008
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.1042
0.0420

0.0166
0.0022

0.0044
0.0000

0.0037
0.0000

0.0055
0.0000

0.0003
0.0000

0.0008
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.0364
0.0074

1202.43

3

Mean
Median

0.0332
0.0128

0.0149
0.0022

0.0059
0.0001

0.0098
0.0000

0.0004
0.0000

0.0002
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.0733
0.0348

0.0106
0.0015

0.0041
0.0000

0.0023
0.0000

0.0054
0.0000

0.0004
0.0000

0.0002
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.0262
0.0056

1645.45

4

Mean
Median

0.0677
0.0262

0.0146
0.0015

0.0063
0.0000

0.0132
0.0000

0.0015
0.0000

0.0001
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.1096
0.0487

0.0291
0.0042

0.0024
0.0000

0.0007
0.0000

0.0073
0.0000

0.0015
0.0000

0.0001
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.0434
0.0115

1259.69

5

Mean
Median

0.0640
0.0174

0.0302
0.0041

0.0147
0.0004

0.0047
0.0000

0.0019
0.0000

0.0009
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.1277
0.0482

0.0142
0.0021

0.0080
0.0000

0.0028
0.0000

0.0023
0.0000

0.0019
0.0000

0.0009
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.0362
0.0058

1499.66

6

Mean
Median

0.0692
0.0217

0.0263
0.0046

0.0078
0.0007

0.0065
0.0000

0.0014
0.0000

0.0005
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.1131
0.0485

0.0226
0.0044

0.0069
0.0001

0.0023
0.0000

0.0045
0.0000

0.0014
0.0000

0.0005
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.0398
0.0104

999.04

7

Mean
Median

0.0193
0.0029

0.0012
0.0000

0.0045
0.0000

0.0044
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.0003
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.0297
0.0146

0.0067
0.0009

0.0005
0.0000

0.0017
0.0000

0.0025
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.0003
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.0117
0.0022

2696.86

b

TAmillion
1308.10

Notes:
a

GICS is an industry classification system, developed by Standard & Poor+
For purposes of this table, some GICS categories were combined yielding 7 industries : Industry 1=Energy + Materials, 2=Industrials, 3=Consumer Discretionary + Consumer Staples, 4=Health Care, 5=Financials,
6=Information Technology, 7=Utilities.
b Extreme values are winsorized within groups and years.
c These are all ratios of write-down provisions or change of provisions to the historical book value of related assets;
Prov1 is the write-down provision for accounts receivables, including accounts receivable and other accounts receivable;
Prov2 is the write-down provision for inventories;
Prov3 is the write-down provision for investments, including short-term and long-term investments;
Prov4 is the write-down provision for fix assets;
Prov5 is the write-down provision for intangible assets;
Prov6 is the write-down provision for construction in progress;
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Prov7 is the write-down provision for commission loans;
Total Prov = Prov1 + Prov2 + Prov3 + Prov4 + Prov5 +Prov6 + Prov7;
∆Prov1 is the changes in write-down provision for accounts receivables, including accounts receivable and other accounts receivable;
∆Prov2 is the changes in write-down provision for inventories;
∆Prov3 is the changes in write-down provision for investments, including short-term and long-term investments;
∆Prov4 is the changes in write-down provision for fix assets;
∆Prov5 is the changes in write-down provision for intangible assets;
∆Prov6 is the changes in write-down provision for construction in progress;
∆Prov7 is the changes in write-down provision for commission loans;
∆Total Prov = ∆Prov1 + ∆Prov2 + ∆Prov3 + ∆Prov4 + ∆Prov5 +∆Prov6 + ∆Prov7;
∆Prov = current period provision - last period provision, which is the amount of current write-down if it is positive;
TA is the industry mean total asset.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables: 1998-2001
Original Data

Winsorized Data

Regressorsa

Mean

Std.dev of
annual means

Mean

Std.dev of
annual means

MVE

10.9779

2.7944

10.9188

2.7729

BVA0

0.7419

0.2381

0.7332

0.2329

BVL

2.3932

0.4762

2.3772

0.4787

BVAH

3.8169

0.5254

3.8007

0.5305

BVAC

3.6361

0.4107

3.6213

0.4164

BVEH

2.1656

0.2890

2.1629

0.2929

BVEC

1.9848

0.1740

1.9860

0.1817

PROV

0.1808

0.1209

0.1755

0.1193

R

0.2591

0.4393

0.2524

0.4374

Eh

0.1092

0.0512

0.1109

0.0491

∆Eh

-0.0254

0.0634

-0.0254

0.0620

Ec

0.0816

0.0460

0.0870

0.0414

∆Ec

-0.0303

0.0406

-0.0307

0.0390

WDGL

0.0275

0.0162

0.025451

0.0152

Notes:
a All the variables are reported in per share amounts, which have been adjusted for stock splits and dividends.
MVE = market value of common equity,
BVA0 = book value of asset other than those affected by write-down regulation,
BVL = book value of liability,
BVAH = historical book value of asset that are affected by write-down regulation, before providing any provisions
BVAC = reported book value of asset that are affected by write-down regulation,
PROV = reported or disclosed book value of asset write-down provision
BVEH =historical book value of net asset,
BVEC =reported book value of net asset,
R

= annual stock return, beginning from three months later after the fiscal year end

Eh

= historical number of earnings before any write-down gains and losses,

∆Eh
Ec
∆Ec

= changes of historical number of earnings before any write-down gains and losses,
= reported earnings
= changes of reported number of earnings

WDGL =write-down gains and losses, with a positive number meaning an losses
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Table 5
Summary Statistics for Balance Sheet Model Regression

MVE it = α 0 + α 1 BVA 0 it + α 2 BVL it + α 3 BVAH it + α 4 PROV it + υ it

a

Panel A: Fixed Effects Regression
1998-2001

Coef.
tb

1999-2001

Coef.
t

α0

α1

α2

α3

α4

adj. R2

nobs.

-

0.059
2.718***

-0.033
-1.712*

0.040
2.280**

-0.275
-7.092***

70.00%

1280

-

0.051
2.258**

-0.080
-4.111***

0.078
4.218***

-0.214
-4.426***

68.10%

960

α0

α1

α2

α3

α4

adj. R2

nobs.

1.550
26.458***

0.314
4.960***

-0.123
-3.290***

0.138
4.305***

0.413
1.201

15.10%

320

2.312
35.104***

0.161
2.800***

-0.016
-0.457

0.001
0.048

-0.036
-0.340

1.50%

320

2.577
55.609***

0.092
2.993***

0.010
0.498

-0.013
-0.808

-0.149
-2.074**

5.20%

320

2.257
45.493***

0.086
3.757***

0.018
1.044

-0.014
-0.874

-0.186
-3.026***

10.50%

320

Panel B: Annual Regression
1998

Coef.
t

1999

Coef.
t

2000

Coef.
t

2001

Coef.
t

Notes:
*** significant at 0.01 level
** significant at 0.05 level
* significant at 0.1 level
a

MVE = Natural log form of per share market value of common equity, three months after the fiscal year-end,
BVA0 = Per share book value of asset other than those affected by write-down regulation ,
BVL = Per share book value of liabilities,
BVAH= Per share historical book value of assets that are affected by write-down regulation , before providing any provisions
PROV= per share reported or disclosed book value of asset write-down provision

b

t values are reported using White (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent estimates
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Table 6
Summary Statistics for Return Model Regression

R it = β 0 + β 1 E ith + β 2 ∆ E ith + β 3WDGL

it

+ ν it

a

Panel A: Fixed Affect Regression
1998-2001

1999-2001

Coef.

β0
-

β1
2.111

β2
0.979

β3
-0.420

tb

-

4.197***

2.707***

-0.918

Coef.
t

-

2.289
3.745***

0.736
1.767*

adj. R2
55.57%

nobs.
1280

-1.530
3.275***

61.18%

960

β3
5.691
4.070***

adj. R2
14.85%

nobs.
320

Panel B: Annual Regression
1998

Coef.
t

β0
0.065
2.760***

β1
0.529
0.721

β2
2.987
4.206***

1999

Coef.
t

0.136
7.208***

1.945
3.671***

1.700
2.824***

-1.627
1.062

13.09%

320

2000

Coef.
t

0.559
30.675***

2.539
3.864***

-1.652
-2.266**

8.20%

320

2001

Coef.
t

-0.286
-18.890***

0.069
0.096

-1.220
-1.916*

8.81%

320

-0.045
-0.091
2.290
3.451***

Notes:
*** significant at 0.01 level
** significant at 0.05 level
*

significant at 0.1 level

a

R = the cumulative market-adjusted return over the 12-month period ending 3 months following fiscal year end
Eh= per share earnings before any write-down accounting adjustments, deflated by the share price at the beginning of the year
∆Eh= the change in Eh
WDGL= per share write-down gains and losses, deflated by the share price at the beginning of the year

b t values are reported in White (1980) adjusted values
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Table 7
Summary Statistics for Price Model Regression
MVEit = γ 0 + γ 1BVEHit + γ 2 PROVit + γ 3 Eith + γ 4WDGLit + ωit
Panel A: Fixed Affect Regression
γ0
1998-2001 Coef.
-

γ1
0.017

γ2
-0.079

tb

-

1.147

-1.722

Coef.
t

-

0.038
2.045

Panel B: Annual Regression
γ0
1998
Coef.
1.575
t
27.769

***

γ1
0.165
5.637

1999-2001

1999

2000

2001

γ3
0.437
*

γ4
-0.188

11.967

***

-3.380

***

***

-0.277
-5.237

***

**

0.043
0.771

0.359
8.747

***

γ2
0.973
0.604

γ3
0.247
1.530

*

γ4
-0.210
-0.146

0.586
5.274

***

-0.593
-1.941

*

Coef.
t

2.313
35.644

***

-0.020
-0.736

0.238
1.840

Coef.
t

2.601
60.903

***

-0.029
-1.616

*

0.081
1.013

0.422
5.455

***

-0.521
-3.241

***

Coef.
t

2.343
51.586

***

-0.042
-2.600

***

0.079
1.072

0.605
7.461

***

-0.238
-2.290

**

*

Notes:
*** significant at 0.01 level
** significant at 0.05 level
* significant at 0.1 level
a

a

MVE = Natural log form of market value of common equity per share, three months after the fiscal year end,
BVEH = per share book value of net asset before the adjustments of asset write-down regulation
PROV = per share amount of asset write-down provisions
Eh = per share earnings before the adjustments of asset write-down gains and losses
WDGL= per share amount of asset write-down gains and losses

b t values are reported in White (1980) adjusted values
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adj. R2
73.37%

nobs.
1280

70.79%

960

adj. R2
14.98%

nobs.
320

6.79%

320

11.84%

320

20.65%

320

Table 8
Non-nested Models Comparison
Panel A: Balance Sheet Modela
adj.R squares
b

1998-2001
1999-2001

H
68.76%
67.30%

J Test
c

L
69.31%
67.87%

d

Test 1
5.978 ***
3.864 ***

Cox Test
e

Test 2
-4.294***
-1.916

Test 1
-30.156***
-15.451***

Test 2

9.288***
5.134***

Panel B: Return Modelf

1998-2001
1999-2001

adj.R squares
H
L
55.59%
54.59%
60.85%
60.75%

Test 1
0.892
2.388 ***

Test 2
4.767 ***
2.717 ***

Cox Test
Test 1
Test 2
-0.823
-5.956***
-3.919***
-4.648***

adj.R squares
H
L
72.71%
72.95%
69.75%
70.52%

J Test
Test 1
4.753 ***
4.613 ***

Test 2
3.668 ***
2.182 **

Cox Test
Test 1
Test 2
-4.581***
-3.353***
-8.697***
-3.182***

J Test

Panel C: Price Modelg

1998-2001
1999-2001

Notes:
** Significant at 0.01 levels
* Significant at 0.05 levels
a Equation (4) and (5)
b Historical cost accounting
c Lower of cost or market accounting
d The null hypothesis in test 1 is that HCA is appropriate, the alternative is that LCM is appropriate
e The null hypothesis in test 2 is LCM is appropriate, the alternative is that HCA is appropriate
f Equation (6) and (7)
g Equation (8) and (9)
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Table 9
Relative Measurement Error
Panel A: Balance Sheet Model
σ2umvac - σ2umvaha
1998-2001

b

Barth (1991)c

Boone (2002)

0.1124

0.0737

F test

3122.9

1999-2001

0.1995

F test

5726.33

562.54

***

***

0.1690
1753.41

***

***

Panel B: Return Model
Vuong's Z valued
1998-2001

Earnings Level
0.411

Earnings Change
0.372

1999-2001

-0.06

-0.044

Notes:
*,**,*** denote significance in two-tailed tests at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a σ2umvah denotes the measurement error variance from asset BVAH, σ2umvac denotes that from asset BVAC.
b Regressions are fix-effects controlled.
c Two approaches are from Barth (1991) and Boone (2002). A positive value in Barth (1991) indicates that
LCM contains more measurement error while the same value in Boone (2002) only indicates that LCM contains
no less measurement error than that in HCA. A negative value in both research shows a decreased measurement error in LCM.
d Vuong test is constructed as HCA versus LCM. A positive Z value indicates that LCM contains more measurement error.
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Table 10
Determinants of Write-down Amounts and Accumulated Provisions
Panel A: Variable Description
Description

Variable

Pool Sample
Mean

Std dev.

Count
(firms)

-

Log Firm Total Assets

SIZE

1.40

0.48

Leverage (%)

LEV

48.45

18.36

Market-to-book Ratio

MTB

5.48

3.82

Change in Market-to-book Ratio
Unclean Audit Opinion (% of firm)
Financial Distress (% of firm)

∆MTB
AO
FD

0.32
7.73
5.23

7.95
26.72
22.28

99
67

Industry Adjusted Return On Asset (%)

IAROA

0.00

6.28

-

Unusually Good Performance (% of firm)

GOOD

10.00

30.01

128

Unusually Poor Performance (% of firm)

POOR

10.00

30.01

128

Small Loss (% of firm)

TURN

6.80

25.18

87

RDIFP
RPROV

1.77
4.53

4.75
7.13

-

Current Write-down Amounts (%)
Accumulated Write-down Provisions (%)

Panel B: Pearson (right) and Spearman (left) Correlation Matrix
AO

ST
SIZE
0.103 0.013
0.000 0.632

LEV MTB
0.157 0.081
0.000 0.004

SIZE
Prob > |R|

0.103
-0.076
0.000
0.007
0.009 -0.086
0.735 0.002

0.228 0.258
0.000 0.000
0.434 -0.230
0.000 0.000

0.085 -0.242
0.002 0.000
-0.082 -0.006
0.003 0.833

-0.043
0.122
-0.114
0.000

0.202
0.000
-0.078
0.005

0.048
0.086
0.017
0.540

LEV
Prob > |R|

0.148
0.000

0.199
0.000

0.287
0.000

0.101 -0.327
0.000 0.000

-0.153
0.000

0.227
0.000

0.010
0.728

MTB
Prob > |R|

0.066
0.018
0.066
0.019

0.201 -0.315
0.000 0.000
0.062 -0.187
0.028 0.000

0.285
0.000
0.120
0.000

0.407
0.000

0.391 -0.083
0.000 0.003
-0.111
0.000

0.103
0.000
-0.029
0.298

0.185
0.000
0.128
0.000

-0.003
0.926
0.005
0.849

IROA
Prob > |R|

-0.289 -0.210 -0.066 -0.321
0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000

0.030
0.288

-0.146
0.000

0.477
0.000

-0.760
0.000

-0.100
0.000

GOOD
Prob > |R|

-0.077 -0.043 -0.096 -0.163
0.006 0.122 0.001 0.000
0.293 0.202 -0.089 0.212
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000

0.142
0.000
0.151
0.000

-0.052 0.518
0.062 0.000
0.188 -0.519
0.000 0.000

-0.111
0.000
-0.111
0.000

-0.090
0.001
-0.059
0.035

-0.089 -0.222

-0.090

-0.059

0.001

0.035

AO
Prob > |R|
ST
Prob > |R|

∆MTB
Prob > |R|

POOR
Prob > |R|
TURN
Prob > |R|

0.435
0.000

0.050

0.048

0.011

0.015

0.015

0.076

0.086

0.687

0.593

0.597
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∆MTB IROA GOOD POOR
0.026 -0.357 -0.077 0.293
0.362 0.000
0.006 0.000

0.001

0.000

TURN
0.050
0.076

-

Table 10 Continued
Panel C: Multivariate Analysis of Factors Influencing Current Write-down Amounts
1998-2001
Intercept

1999-2001

1998

Est.

t

Est.

t

Est.

-

-

-

-

0.004

1.228

t

AO

0.034

4.026

***

0.030

2.626

***

0.015

1.665

FD

-0.033

-3.163

***

-0.036

-2.990

***

0.003

0.431

SIZE

-0.012

-1.529

-0.008

-0.727

-0.003

-1.785

LEV

0.054

2.276

**

0.068

2.010

**

0.001

∆MTB

-0.001

-2.034

**

-0.001

-1.956

*

IAROA

-0.139

-2.240

**

-0.138

-1.926

*

GOOD

0.022

3.486

***

0.026

3.287

POOR

-0.009

-0.889

-0.011

-0.876

TURN

-0.023

-4.607

-0.027

-4.551

R-square

***

14.58%

***
***

13.68%

1999
Est.
0.033

t

Est.

3.853

***
*

0.012

2001

t

Est.

1.028

0.003

t
0.237

0.024

1.953

0.021

1.555

0.071

2.388

-0.015

-1.291

-0.005

-0.310

-0.036

-1.580

0.001

0.140

0.000

0.051

-0.010

-1.162

*

0.261

0.003

0.235

-0.002

-0.131

0.055

2.237

**

0.000

-1.037

-0.001

-1.791

0.000

-0.954

-0.001

-0.824

-0.045

-0.885

-0.329

-3.157

***

-0.167

-1.119

-0.286

-1.758

0.003

0.682

0.019

2.017

**

0.027

2.202

**

0.041

2.899

0.017

2.140

-0.003

-0.190

-0.043

-1.830

*

-0.025

-0.905

-0.006

-1.378

-0.002

-0.195

-0.025

-2.393

***

-0.018

-2.727

24.08%

*

2000

*

**

*

13.81%

5.33%

***

*
***
***

21.62%

Panel D: Multivariate Analysis of Factors Influencing Accumulated Write-down Accumulated Provisions
variable
Intercept

1998-2001

1999-2001

1998
t

1999
Est.

2000

t

Est.

2001

Est.

t

Est.

t

Est.

-

-

-

-

0.001

0.304

0.033

3.726

***

0.071

4.554

t
***

Est.
0.101

3.949

t
***

***

0.069

4.047

***

0.086

2.718

***

AO

0.030

3.794

***

0.019

2.239

**

0.011

1.234

0.028

2.384

FD

0.034

3.171

***

0.033

3.258

***

0.004

0.540

0.008

0.694

0.068

2.975

***

0.073

2.424

***

SIZE

-0.079

-7.224

***

-0.083

-6.904

***

-0.001

-0.309

-0.003

-0.488

-0.018

-2.134

**

-0.044

-2.823

***

LEV

0.130

4.132

***

0.156

4.615

***

-0.001

-0.139

0.016

0.895

0.021

0.878

0.104

2.797

***

MTB

-0.004

-2.597

***

-0.005

-3.517

***

0.001

0.848

0.001

0.629

-0.002

-2.229

-0.006

-2.229

**

IAROA

-0.172

-2.656

**

-0.151

-2.319

**

-0.051

-0.989

-0.437

-4.010

-0.266

-1.358

-0.490

-2.763

***
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***

**

continued
GOOD

-0.024

3.796

POOR

0.014

1.459

TURN

-0.013

-2.557

R-square

***
**

63.11%

0.024

3.347

***

0.002

0.548

0.022

2.120

**

0.017

1.895

-0.018

-3.260

***

-0.003

-0.590

72.32%

25.46%

*

0.025

2.656

-0.008
0.005

0.030

1.871

-0.416

0.005

0.433

-0.008

23.38%

***

34.14%

*

0.042

2.644

0.211

0.042

1.335

-0.441

-0.001

-0.066

49.16%

Notes:
*,**,*** denote significance in two-tailed tests at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a

Following variables are computed with historical data:
SIZE = Ln (per share total asset );
LEV = total liability / total asset;
MTB = market value of equity/book value of equity;
∆MTB = MTBt- MTBt-1;
IAROA = ROA - ROAmean, where ROA = earning / total asset and ROAmean is the industry mean ROA

b

FD,AO,GOOD, POOR and TURN are binary dummy variables. FD stands for finance distress, FD=1 if a company is in "ST" or "PT"; AO stands for
audit opinion, AO=1 if a company receives an qualified opinion that year; GOOD stands for good performance, GOOD=1 if a company's industry
adjusted ROA achieves a top 10%; POOR stands for poor performance, POOR=1 if its ROA is in bottom 10%; TURN stands for the possibility
to turn profit, TURN=1if a company's current earnings per share is within the area of -0.1 to 0.
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Table 11
Descriptions for Sub Samples
Panel A:

Firm distribution

Industry by GICS
Energy & Materials
Industrials
Consumer Discretionary & Staples
Health Care
Financials
Information Technology
Utilities
Sum

Full Sample
53
63
92
30
33
34
15
320

Higha,b
24
28
53
16
18
24
3
166

%
45.28%
44.44%
57.61%
53.33%
54.55%
70.59%
20.00%
51.88%

Panel B: Firm Profile
Median

Mean
Low

High

T test

Low

Wilcoxo
High n Z test

RPROVc
0.017
0.071
-15.078***
0.013
0.045 -14.150***
ROA
0.046
0.008
11.180***
0.044
0.022 10.452***
IAROA
0.019
-0.018
11.151***
0.020
-0.005 10.401***
MTB
5.111
5.828
-3.396***
4.213
4.689 -3.444***
∆MTB
-0.003
0.628
-1.461
-0.109
0.231 -2.509**
AO
0.023
0.128
-7.363***
0.000
0.000 -7.042***
FD
0.013
0.089
-6.345***
0.000
0.000 -6.087***
GOOD
0.125
0.077
2.879***
0.000
0.000
2.870***
POOR
0.016
0.178
-10.288***
0.000
0.000 -9.618***
TURN
0.044
0.090
-3.316***
0.000
0.000 -3.303***
R
0.255
0.250
1.314
0.120
0.132
0.860
SIZE
1.386
1.407
-0.783
1.400
1.395 -0.162
LEV
0.459
0.509
-4.913***
0.460
0.514 -4.689***
Notes:
*** Significant at the level of 0.01
** Significant at the level of 0.05
* Significant at the level of 0.1
a I rank the annual sample by absolutes value of current write-down ratio and mark the top 20% portfolio as
the high written down firms. If the firms were marked as "high" in one of the sample years, they will be
categorized in HIGH sample. Otherwise, they will be categorized in LOW sample.
b 2-way table chi-squared statistic is 14.52, significant at the 0.05 level
c see Table 10 for definitions other than RET
see Table 4 for definitions for R.
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Table 12
Non-nested Model Comparisons in Sub Samples
Panel A: Balance Sheet Model
Low

1998-2001
1999-2001

adj.R squares
H
W
69.09% 69.07%
66.89% 66.91%

J Testa
Test 1
Test 2
-2.072**
2.137**
0.469
-0.29

High
Cox Test

Test 1
93.359***
-15.45***

Test 2

-281.4***
8.943***

adj.R squares
H
W
69.97% 70.75%
68.35% 69.13%

J Test
Test 1
4.306***
3.103***

Cox Test

Test 2
-2.298**
-1.125

Test 1
-17.88***
-12.86***

Test 2

5.004***
3.121***

Panel B: Return Model
Low

1998-2001
1999-2001

adj.R squares
H
W
60.19% 60.66%
64.36% 64.92%

J Test
Test 1
2.406***
2.269**

High

Test 2
0.572
0.533

Cox Test
Test 1
Test 2
-4.076***
-0.888
-4.79***
-0.932

adj.R squares
H
W
54.93% 54.42%
60.37% 60.68%

Cox Test
Test 1
Test 2
-4.938***
-0.82
-7.318***
-0.524

adj.R squares
H
W
73.50% 74.05%
70.06% 71.31%

J Test
Test 1
1.001
2.006**

Test 2
2.555***
1.186

Cox Test
Test 1
Test 2
-1.648*
-5.2***
-6.665***
-3.17***

Panel C: Price Model
Low

1998-2001
1999-2001

adj.R squares
H
W
73.51% 73.86%
70.56% 71.21%

J Test
Test 1
9.156***
2.631***

High

Test 2
0.47
0.244

Notes:
*** Significant at the level of 0.01
** Significant at the level of 0.05
a Tests are defined in Table 8.
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J Test
Test 1
4.213***
3.96***

Test 2
2.692***
1.239

Cox Test
Test 1
Test 2
-5.627***
-3.2***
-11.01***
-2.29**

Table 13
Relative Measurement Error in Sub Samples
Panel A: Balance Sheet Model
σ2umvac - σ2umvach
Low
Barth
(1991)
19982001

-0.0525

F test

4377.22

19992001

-0.0320

F test

1099.54

High
Barth
(1991)

Boone
(2002)
-0.0709
***

5373.85

0.2109
***

-0.0471
***

1662.56

Boone
(2002)

3377.31

0.1723
***

0.2394
***

2010.71

895.88

0.1975
***

601.90

Panel B: Return Model
Vuong's Z value
Low
Earnings
Level

High
Earnings
Level

Earnings
Change

Earnings
Change

19982001

-0.162

-0.414

0.138

0.182

19992001

-0.465

-0.660

-0.474

-0.232

Notes:

*,**,*** denote significance in two-tailed tests at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a

Tests are defined in Table 9
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Appendix A: Model Specification45
I. Model Derivation
Various parties such as shareholders, investors or lenders will have explicit
interests in valuing firms. Modern accounting and finance research began with ideas
of finding mis-priced securities. During the past several decades, researchers devised
numerous models to estimate firms’ intrinsic values. Three major models were
developed: dividend-discounting, capitalization, and residual income valuation.
I - 1. Discounting models

The discounting model is often referred to as dividend discounting. The model
defines share price as the present value of expected future dividends discounted at
their risk-adjusted expected rate of return. Formally,
Pt = ∑k =1to∞ {Et [ Dt + k ]} / ∏ j =1tok (1 + rt + j )

(A-1)

where Pt is share price at time t, Et[Dt+k] is market’s expectation of dividends in
period t+k, and Rt+j is risk-adjusted discount rate that reflects the systematic risk of
dividends in period t+j.
As seen from (A-1), price depends on forecasts of future dividends and discount
rates for future periods. The Gordon growth model makes simplifying assumptions.
Specifically, if the discount rate, r, is constant through time and dividends are

45

Some contents are based on existing review papers, for example, Kothari (2001).
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expected to grow at a constant rate g (g<r), then the value of a firm can be expressed
in terms of expected dividends, discount rate and constant growth rate:
Pt = Et [ Dt +1 ] /(r − g )

(A-2)

Though the discounting model has theoretical foundations, it is not often
employed in empirical research because of its restrictive assumptions. Finance
researchers soon simplified this model. Later research points out, the dividend policy
per se does not affect firm value, instead, it is the firm’s investment policy that
matters. The growth rate also depends on reinvestment, which can increase future
market value. This approach led to models laying stress on investment and its
capitalization process.
I-2. The capitalization models

The idea of the capitalization models is that a firm’s value is either the sum of
past operating results or the expectations of future operating results. The first
approach is the equity model: the value of a firm is the result of investments and
reinvestments transformed into equity. The share price in this model is:
Pt = MVEt + u t

(A-3)

where Pt is share price at time t, MVEt is market value of equity at time t, and ut is
error term caused by unrecognized accounting information or conservatism.
(A-3) can be decomposed as:
Pt = MVAt + MVLt + u t

(A-4)

where MVAt is market value of assets at time t, MVLt is market value of liability at
time t, and ut is error term. Here the firm’s market value is a weighted combination of
asset and liability market value (Landsman 1986). Book value of assets and liabilities
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are often used as proxies for market value of assets and liabilities, because the market
values are seldom available. That is,
Pt = BVEt + u t = BVAt + BVLt + u t

(A-5)

where BVEt is book value of equity at time t, BVAt is book value of asset at time t,
BVLt is book value of liability at time t, and ut is error term.
(A-5) is referred to as the “balance sheet model”, and its format varies with
different research objects. The balance sheet model was first used by Beaver et al
(1989) in research on non-performing loans and later used by Barth et al (1991).
Since then, this model has been frequently used in accounting research because of its
conceptual basis and ease of application in accounting setting. Moreover, it is
suitable for research that focuses on measurement error in reported accounting
numbers (Barth 1991, 1994, Choi, et al. 1997, Boone 2002).
The second view is that firm value is the expectation of future operating results,
which is closely related to the discounting models. If the expected return on
investment in all future periods is r, then the share price Pt can be expressed as:
Pt =

E ( X t +1 )
+ vt
r

(A-6)

where E(Xt+1) is forecasted earnings for the next period at the time t, r is return rate
that supposed to be constant over periods, and νt is an error term.
Equation (A-6) can be explained as the “capitalized value of the earnings stream
produced by the assets that the firm currently holds.” Earnings capitalization models
are popular in accounting research, especially in earnings response coefficient
research. E(Xt+1) is replaced with Xt , which is the current income, when incomes are
assumed to be constant in future periods.
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Despite apparent differences between the balance sheet model and the income
capitalization model, they both reduce to the income statement model mathematically.
Take first differences in the balance sheet model, (A-5), obtaining,
∆Pt = ∆BVEt + ∆u t

(A-7)

Next, ∆BVEt = X t − d t , which means the current year’s change in net worth is
caused only by the change in the income statement, current earnings Xt, and the
current dividend dt. (A-7) can be transformed into the income statement model,
Re t t = (∆Pt + d t ) / Pt −1 = X t / Pt −1 + u ' t

(A-8)

where, Rett is the holding return from time t-1 to time t, including price increase and
dividend, Xt is current earnings as of t, Pt-1 is share price at t-1, and u’t is the error.
One can, by the same token, derive the income statement model from (A-6).
Suppose that the current share price is cum-dividend, and this relation holds
constantly. (A-9) is the earnings capitalization model for time t-1:
Pt −1 =

X t −1
+ vt −1
r

(A-9)

Subtracting (A-9) from (A-6) gives an alternative expression of the income statement
model in change of earnings:
1
Re t t = ( Pt − Pt −1 ) / Pt −1 = (∆X t / Pt −1 ) + vt'
r

(A-10)

It is an empirical issue whether level of earnings or change of earnings better
explains security returns. Ball and Brown (1968), as well as Beaver (1968), have set
the basic theoretical work for the income statement model in the 1960s. They define
the information content of earnings in terms of abnormal earnings, measured by the
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difference between actual and expected earnings, with expected earnings estimated
as last year’s actual earnings. The reason to use abnormal earnings is testing the
market reaction to so-called “good news” or “bad news” within a specific window
rather than the change of earnings in reaction tests. However, others use the level of
earnings. Therefore, there are two competing constructs for measuring information
content in earnings. Efficient securities market theory predicts that security prices
will react quickly and in an unbiased manner to new information and there should be
no abnormal returns under both methods. When the assumption of efficient markets
is relaxed, however, matters become less clear. Ball and Brown (1968) believe that
the return in their model is better explained by abnormal earnings. Easton and Harris
(1991) further develop the model of Ball and Brown (1986) and suggest that both the
level model (A-8) and change model (A-10) proxy for abnormal earnings and can be
used to account for market return. They suggest use of a mixed level and change
model:
Re t t = X t / Pt −1 + ∆X t −1 / Pt −1 + vt''

(A-11)

The explanatory power of the income statement model is generally lower than
that of the balance sheet or capitalization models. Market volatility can also reduce
explanatory power, which effect is conspicuous in China (Lee and Cao 2002).
I-3. The residual income models

The Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) residual income valuation
model has become popular in the literature. Starting with a dividend-discounting
model, the residual income valuation model expresses firm value as the sum of
current book value and the discounted present value of expected abnormal earnings,
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which combines the previous two capitalization views. The standard residual income
model is expressed as:
Et [ X t + k − r * BVEt + k −1 ]
(1 + r ) k
k =1
∞

Pt = BVEt + ∑

(A-12)

where BVEt is book value of equity at time t, Et is the expectation operator where the
expectation is based on information available at time t, Xt is current earnings for
period t, and r is risk-adjusted discount rate .
Olhson (1995) imposes a time-series structure on the abnormal earnings ( X ta )
in (A-12). The linear information dynamics in the model specifies an autoregressive,
time-series decay in the current period’s abnormal earnings (A-13), and models
“information other than abnormal earnings” into prices (A-14).
X ta+1 = ωX ta + vt + ε 1,t +1

(A-13)

vt +1 = γvt + ε 2,t +1

(A-14)

where νt is the correlated residual in time t and εt is the uncorrelated residual in time t.
The two equations above are known as the Olhson (1995) model.
The economic intuition for the autoregressive process in abnormal earnings is
that competition will sooner or later erode above-normal returns and that firms who
are experiencing below-normal rates of returns eventually exit the market. The other
information in the Ohlson model formalized the idea that prices reflect a richer
information set than transaction-based, historical-cost earnings. The Feltham and
Ohlson (1995) model (hereafter, F-O model) retains much of the structure of the
Ohlson(1995) except the autoregressive time-series process. As one of the few
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attempts in accounting theory to address empirical finance issues, the F-O model is
often used in empirical research ( Burgstahler and Dichev 1997).
The F-O model is superior to the dividend-discounting model in its ease of
implementation. First, the assumptions are more common and make the work easier.
Second, it provides a role for many important features of the accounting system,
covering areas like clean surplus, book value as well as earnings, transitory
components of earnings, conservatism, and delayed recognition. However, some
aspects of this model are unsupported by the empirical data, such as linearity
properties. It should be pointed out that most of the F-O models are conducted in
“reduced forms”, rather than the original residual income model. Often, abnormal
earnings are replaced with current year earnings, which form the “price model”,
where market equity value becomes a function of book value of equity and current
earnings. This model is:
Pt = BVEt + X t + ε t

(A-15)

where Pt is share price in time t, BVEt is book value of equity per share in time t, and
Xt is reported net income per share in time t.
Each model may be able to explain share prices in some aspects. It is not wise to
criticize one model on the grounds that its assumptions are too restrictive to represent
the real world. Model efficiency should be examined empirically.

II. The Discussion on Model Inappropriateness and Possible Remedy
It is expected that stock price does not have a linear association with accounting
information in China. The U.S. market saw an escalating gap between the book and
market value during the last 20 years of the 20th century. There is some doubt
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whether the linear model used pervasively in accounting research could capture the
market-book relation that could actually be nonlinear. Also, researchers are less
likely to uncover a one to one relation between market and book value, the
theoretical assumption still held by many researchers. If I use conventional models in
this study, results could be biased due to model mis-specification.
First, a nonlinear relation between market and book value could exist in China,
where resources are not evenly distributed. Listed companies are more or less
controlling scare resources that bring extra profits, which could either be a privilege,
a technology advantage, or a monopoly. HW 2001 note that, if the firm has some
competitive advantage, for example, proprietary technology that may not be
separable and saleable, that allows it to earn a positive abnormal return (economic
rents), then (A-5), the balance sheet model, might not hold. In such a case, total
equity value exceeds the combined value of net assets, even if the assets are valued at
market. Then equity value is a weighted average of operations value (value from
continuing operations plus value of future expansion) and abandonment value (net
asset value) (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). If agency costs are low, the firm will
liquidate when the value of net assets value exceeds the operations value of the firm.
It is especially important to consider the abandonment option, without which the
value of net assets is not associated with the value of the firm except to the extent it
affects future operating cash flows. Although some investors in China can sell shares
if the price has reached the abandonment point, it is difficult for the State
government, who is the major investor in china, to liquidate. Considering that the
majority shareholder in China is the State rather than individual investors, the effect
of abandonment value is relatively small. Therefore, the relation between firm value
and value of net assets value is neither zero nor a one-to-one linearity in China. If
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operations value exceeds net assets but there is a likelihood of abandonment then
equity value could has a nonlinear relation with net assets (Wysocki 1999).
Second, existing models by no means incorporate all the variables reflected in
market price because of information asymmetry. The information that investors rely
on might be quite different from reported accounting information. For example,
political information and rumor are important in China. Therefore stock prices
incorporate some information that is not explained by accounting numbers. Model
inappropriateness leads to biased results even if the market-book relation is linear.
Remedies against model inappropriateness vary in practice. Many valuerelevance studies using the balance sheet model allow the possibility that firms have
a competitive advantage. To eliminate the economic rent effect, some researchers
convert it to an identity by including a goodwill term, defined as the difference
between market value of equity and net asset value:
MVE = BVA + BVL + GW

(A-16)

where MVE is the security market value, BVA is the book value of equity, BVL is
the book value of liability, and GW = goodwill = MVE - MVA -MVL. Sometimes,
researchers incorporate variables in their model to proxy non-accounting information,
for example, an indicator variable for bull or bear market.
Variable adding is one remedy, equation transformation is the other. As
proposed by many researchers, it is difficult to construct a non-linear model,
especially in accounting. Transformation is used in most applications, in the belief
that many complex functional relations are intrinsically linear and can be linearized
by transformation, e.g. logarithms, exponentials, reciprocals and polynomials.
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The relation between equity market values and accounting numbers will not be
purely linear in reality, which can be seen from a simple market-book line drawn in
X-Y bars. The non-linearity draws a concave shape line, suggesting an exponential
relation between market and book value. A hybrid of the linear and log-linear models,
the semi-log equation would be a good candidate.
LnY = β 1 + β 2 X + ε

(A-17)

where Y is the market value and X is the book value. Ln denotes the natural log
function. The coefficient in a semi-log model has a special meaning. A one-unit
increase in net asset causes a β-percent increase in stock price. By the same token, a
one-unit increase in earning could trigger a β-percent increase in return. The effect of
the semi-log transformation can only be examined empirically.
I perform balance sheet model (equation 1) regressions on both the
untransformed and the semi-log transformed data. Annual data is used so I drop the
survival criterion from my previous sample criteria. 542 firms are picked in 1998,
655 firms in 1999, 780 firms in 2000 and 884 firms in 2001. Results (not reported in
detail here) give sufficient evidence that the semi-log model fits better. First, three
out of four adjusted R squares are higher in semi-log models than in untransformed
models. Second, as expected, all the coefficients in semi-log models are significant at
least at 0.1 levels. However, several coefficients in the untransformed models are
unexpectedly insignificant, for example, the coefficient on BVL is -0.609 (t=-1.627)
in 1998 and that on BVAH is 0.0237 (t=0.103) in 1999. Third, residual analysis also
supports the semi-log model. The residuals of the semi-log regressions appear
approximately normal, while the residuals of the untransformed models exhibit a
quadratic pattern. Normality is tested by skewness and kurtosis tests and a joint Wald
test of both skewness and kurtosis. All three tests reject the hypothesis that the
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residuals are normal for the untransformed models. The results are much better in the
semi-log models, with skewness and kurtosis much closer to normal distribution
values. In some cases, normality cannot be rejected despite the high power of the test
due to large sample sizes. Fourth, the distribution of residuals against fitted values
indicates a serious heteroskedasticity problem in the untransformed models.46 For the
semi-log model, heteroskedasticity is not visually apparent. Finally, the histogram of
standardized residuals presents further evidence that the distribution is much more
asymmetric for the untransformed models than for the semi-log models. Descriptive
statistics also indicate that the semi-log model is better in capturing the market-book
relation. Average net assets increased from 1.81 to 2.19 during the four-year period,
achieving a 20.99% growth. The average untransformed market value, however,
achieves a 39.92% growth. The growth rate is for log market value is 18.58%, much
closer to the one to one book-market theoretical relation. Based on the above
discussion, the semi-log model should be favored in balance sheet model regression.
Further comparisons done using the return and price models again favor the
semi-log models. It is clear that the semi-log transformation is a practical way to
improve the model fitness in this paper, even if the untransformed balance sheet
model is appropriate. Therefore, I will use semi-log transformations of equity market
value and market return. To avoid infinite logarithmic transformations of returns, I
add 1 to all returns prior to transformation:
Ln(1 + Re t t ) where 1 + Re t t > 0

46

(A-17)

The White (1980) t test could solve this problem in both models.
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III. Fixed Effects and Random Effects
Data sets can comprise either time series or cross sections. The data sets that
combine both are called longitudinal or panel data sets. This paper employs a panel
in the multivariate regressions. Greene (2003) points out that “the fundamental
advantage of a panel data set over a cross section is that it will allow the researcher
great flexibility in modeling differences in behavior across individuals.” A pooled
regression cannot fully capture the heterogeneity, or individual effects, among
different firms and years. It is especially important to control the firm and year
effects in stock market research in China. Firms’ different backgrounds determine
their different sensitivities to regulations and rules. These specific firm attributes
should be controlled in market research. For example, the share price of the listed
companies in western China out-performed the rest of the market when the
government announced the “Western China Development” Program.
Fixed effects and random effects are often used to improve estimation of
regression coefficients by avoiding the omitted variable problem. The fixed effects
approach takes one “fixed” term as a group-specific constant and assigns each of the
firm-year observations an independent constant. If the unobserved individual year
and firm effects are correlated with the regressors, omitting the effects will bias
estimation of the regressors. The fixed effects regression model is:
'

Yit = α i + γ t + β x it + ε it

(A-18)

where Yit is the dependent variable, β and xit are vectors of parameters and
independent variables, respectively, αi is the firm-specific effect that is fixed across
years, γt is the year-specific effect that is fixed across firms, and εit is the remaining
residual (capturing the effect of all omitted variables). The fixed effects are dummy
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variables that each sum to 1, hence one of the time and one of the firm effects must
be omitted (and an overall constant permitted) in order to avoid perfect collinearity.
Results for these dummy variables are not reported in the tables, as they serve
only a control function to improve estimation of the regressors of interest in this
research.
The random effects regression model is based on a random sample from the
target population. If the sample is random, individual effects are uncorrelated with
the regressors and randomly distributed across cross-sectional units. That is,
Yit = α + β ' x it + vi + u t + ε it

(A- 19)

where νi is the random disturbance characterizing the ith observation and is constant
through time, and ut is the random disturbance characterizing year t, and ε it is the
remaining residual.
An important of advantage of the random effects model is increased degrees of
freedom over the fixed effects model. The sample used in this study, however, is not
random. A priori, then, I assume the fixed effects model is more appropriate for
purposes of this study. Nevertheless, as Greene (2003) notes, the distinction is not
theoretically clear-cut, and it is possible for the assumptions of the random effects
model to be met in non-random samples. The Hausman specification test (Greene
2003, 301) assesses the propriety of the random effects assumption. For the panel
data used in this study, the Hausman test rejects the assumptions of orthogonality
between the random effects and regressors at less than the 0.01 level for all models.
Therefore, I employ the fixed effects model in the study. I note, nevertheless, that the
results using the random effects model on this panel data set are qualitatively similar
to the fixed effects results reported here.
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Appendix B: Non-nested Model Test
I. J Test
The J test addresses the problem of choosing between two possible sets of
regressors, where the sets are overlapping but non-nested. That is, the two sets share
some, but not all, regressors, and there are distinctive regressors in both sets. I
illustrate the J test in the balance sheet model as an example.
The null hypothesis H0 is that HCA is the correct model; the alternative H1 is
that LCM is the correct model. Run the following regressions:
MVEit = ψ 0 + ψ 1 BVA0 it + ψ 2 BVLit + ψ 3 BVAH it + ψ 4 MVˆEitc + ρ it

(A-20)

where MV̂E itc is the fitted market value of equity from equation (5), i.e. from the
LCM balance sheet model. This LCM fitted value is added into equation (4) to form
equation (A-20). In this equation, a test of ψ 4 = 0 would be a test of null hypothesis
H0. A significant ψ 4 would reject the null and accept the alternative that LCM is the
better model. The idea of the J test (which is relatively non-parametric and intuitively
plausible) is that, if HCA is the correct model and LCM is not the correct model, the
fitted values from the LCM regression cannot be useful in fitting the HCA regression.
The J test is symmetric, however, and one can interchange the models and
repeat the test. That is, run the following regression:
MVEit = ψ ' 0 + ψ '1 BVA0 it + ψ ' 2 BVLit + ψ ' 3 BVACit + ψ ' 4 MVˆEith + ρ 'it

(A-21)

where MV̂E ith is the fitted market value of equity from equation (4), i.e. from the
HCA balance sheet model.
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The J test can have four possible outcomes: reject HCA only, reject LCM only,
reject both HCA and LCM, reject neither HCA nor LCM. In most empirically tests,
models are advanced only as approximately correct for the data analyzed. In this
situation, and because of shared variables, the J test often rejects both models, but
rejection can occur at a level considerably lower for one model than the other. Such a
result qualitatively favors the lower level.

II. Cox Test
This likelihood ratio test is an extension of a general test of Cox (1961, 1962).
Here I illustrate it with the income statement model. Like the J test, the Cox test is
symmetric, and two tests are performed, in which the LCM and HCA models are
interchanged. The following does the first test that H0: HCA model is correct; H1:
LCM model is correct.

)
Step 1, regress R on Eh and ∆Eh and compute Rh and residual eh , and S 2h = eh ' eh / n .
Step

2,

regress

R

on

Ec

and

∆Ec

and

compute

)
Rh and residual ec , and S c2 = ec ' ec / n .
)
Step 3, regress Rh on E c and ∆E c , then compute the residual ech .
Step 4, regress ech on E h and ∆E h , then compute the residual ehch .

Step 5, compute S

Step 6, q =

2
ch

 e' e
S c2
n
= S + e' ch ech / n, c 01 = log 2 , v 01 = S h2 *  hch 2 hch
2
S ch
 S ch
2
h

2


 .



c01
and check the q value against the critical standard normal
v 01

value, for example, the 5 percent critical value of 1.96.
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Reverse the HCA and LCM roles and repeat the above steps to complete the
two-way tests. The Cox test is generally more powerful than the J test, but is
essentially parametric, relying on the assumption that the residuals are normally
distributed (the likelihood ratio is that of the normal distribution). Thus the Cox test
is less robust than J test.

III. Vuong Test
Vuong has provided a likelihood ratio test for model selection to test the null
hypothesis that the two models are equally close to explaining the “true data
generating process” against the alternative that one model is closer. For example, if
we test whether earnings A is closer to true earnings than earnings B, we could
construct the following equation specified in Dechow (1994):
mi =

 RSS B  n  e Bi
e 
1
log 
− Ai 
+ 
2
 RSS A  2  RSS B RSS A 

(A-22)

Equation (A-22) is a simplification obtained from the Vuoung’s original
procedures. We can obtain the Vuong’s z-statistic by regressing mi on unity. The
coefficient in this regression will equal ½ Log[RSSb/RSSa] and tells us the mean
difference in explanatory power between earnings B and earnings A. The standard
error from the regression tells us whether the relationship is unusual, i.e. if the
difference is significant. The z-statistic can be obtained by multiplying the t-statistic
from the regression by ((n-1)/n)1/2. Note that a positive z-statistic implies that the
residuals produced by the earnings B are larger in magnitude than those from
earnings A. Hence, a positive and significant z-statistic indicates that earnings A has
less measurement error. Dechow (1994) clearly illustrates the above procedures.
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Appendix C: Relative Measurement Error Research
This appendix illustrates the theory and practical computation for the relative
measurement error. Measurement error is defined as the difference between book
value and its corresponding market value, which comprise their intrinsic market
values and measurement errors. I start this research from the balance sheet model.
BVA0 = MVA0 + υ mva 0

(A-23)

BVL = MVL + υ mvl
BVA = MVA + υ mva
(A-23) shows the book-to-market relations in the balance sheet model, where
MVA0, MVL and MVA denote market values, and umva0, umvl and umva denote
measurement errors. These measurement errors become the statistical residual.
residual = - γ1*umva0 - γ2* umvl - γ3*umva

(A-24)

where γi are estimated coefficients for BVA0, BVL and BVA, respectively (i=1,2,3).
Absent measurement error, accounting data fit the balance sheet model perfectly,
leaving no intercept or residual and capitalizing assets and liabilities at the rate of 1.
If measurement error does exit, we would observe intercepts, residuals and biased
coefficients in almost all regressions. The measurement error could be either positive
or negative, depending on its attributes. E.g., fixed assets or contingent liabilities
might be underestimated, producing a positive measurement error. Measurement
error causes bias in coefficient estimations, as shown in equation (A-25):
MVE = γ 0 + (1 − B1 ) BVA0 + (1 − B2 ) BVL + (1 − B3 ) BVA + υ

(A-25)

Bk is the proxy for biases in the coefficients (k = 1, 2, 3). The relative measurement
error is computed as the relative magnitude of measurement error variance from
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47
2
2
2
these coefficients biases, i.e. σ umva
Barth (1991) uses proxies for
0 , σ umvl and σ umva .

assessing the variance and covariance structures of the measurement error. The
coefficient biases are expressed with Yi and other variables:
B1 = −[(

β 31
β
1
)Y3 + ( 21
)Y2 − ( 2 )Y1 )]
2
2
σ e3
σ e2
σ e1

B2 = −[(

B3 = −[(

(A-26)

β 32
β12
1
)
Y
+
(
)Y1 − ( 2 )Y2 ]
3
2
2
σ e3
σ e1
σ e2

β 23
β
1
)Y2 + ( 132 )Y1 − ( 2 )Y3 )]
2
σ e2
σ e1
σ e3

Yi denotes the variance-covariance structures of particular measurement
errors, β ij and σ ei2 are operationally defined as the slope coefficients and residual
variance obtained from the auxiliary regression specified in equation (A-27): 48
BVA0 = β10 + β12 BVL + β13 BVA + e1

(A-27)

BVL = β 20 + β 21 BVA0 + β 23 BVA + e2
BVA = β 30 + β 31 BVA0 + β 32 BVL + e3
Barth (1991) estimates the magnitude of Yi through the matrixes in (A-26) and
(A-27). Choi, et al (1997) further simplifies this procedure in a 2-stage regression.
The Yi are assessed by the coefficient φi in the following equation:49

47

Unfortunately, these variances are interact with other variances, forming complex variancecovariance constructs.
48

No restrictions are posed in Yi except that there is no relation between two market value
variables. Different restrictions lead to different computations of relative measurement error. For
example, Boone (2002) assumes that each measurement error and its underlying market value should
exert effects on all measurement errors. Barth (1991), however, poses more rigid restrictions.
49

Seemingly related regression method is used in estimation for HCA and LCM data because
they are actually related.
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MVE

error

= φ 0 + φ1 Z bva 0 + φ 2 Z bvl + φ3 Z bva + ω

(A-28)

where:
 BVA0 − β12 BVL + β13 BVA 
Z bva 0 = − 

σ e21


 BVl − β 21 BVA0 + β 23 BVA 
Z bvl = − 

σ e22



 BVA − β 31 BVA0 + β 32 BVL 
Z bva = − 

σ e23



MVEh error = MVE − ( BVA0 + BVL + BVAh)
MVEc error = MVE − ( BVA0 + BVL + Sh / Sc * BVAc)
MVE, BVA0, BVL, BVAh, BVAc, β ij and σ ei2 are defined in equation (A-26),
and Sh/Sc is a scale factor: Sh as the mean value of BVAh and Sc of BVAc.50
After the magnitude of the variance and covariance structure is estimated, it is
possible to estimate the magnitude of measurement error variance. However,
different assumptions lead to different interpretations of the variance and covariance
structure, and, therefore, different measurement error variance. For this reason, I first
explore the variance and covariance structure.
Consider (A-25) without BVA0. Now let BVA0 enter (A-25). Its market value
MVA0 will interact with its measurement error umva0 and other existing measurement
errors from assets and liabilities. MVA0 does not interact with other market values.51
The new measurement error, umva0, will interact with all the market values and
50

Scale differences between BVAH and BVAC, though not large (around 1.04), confound
comparisons of measurement error variance because variance is a function of scale (i.e.
Var(sx)=s2Var(x)). Following Barth (1991) and Boone (2002), I multiply the factors in my models.
51

Market values are assumed to be uncorrelated.
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measurement errors.52 It is the same for BVL and BVA, so the variance-covariance
structure could be expressed as (A-29):
Y1 = σ mva0, umva0 + σ mva0, umvl + σ mva0, umva + σ umvl, umva0 + σ umva, umva0 + σ2umva0
Y2 = σ mvl, umva0 + σ mvl, umvl + σ mvl, umva + σ umvl, umva0 + σ umva, umvl + σ2umvl
Y3 = σ mva, umva0 + σ mva, umvl + σ mva, umva + σ umva0, umva + σ umvl, umva + σ2umva
Y1 is the variance and covariance structure for BVA0 and σ2umva0 is the
measurement error variance for BVA0; Y2 is the structure for BVL and σ2umvl is the
measurement error variance for BVL; Y3 is the structure for BVA while the σ2umva is
the measurement error variance for BVA. Consider that BVA could either be BVAH
under the HCA or be BVAC under the LCM; the research question is whether their
measurement error variances, σ2umvah and σ2umvac, are equal.
Barth (1991) assumes that measurement errors in MVA are uncorrelated with
other variables. That is to say, the value of some covariances are zero; in Y3, e.g., σ
mva, umva,

σ

umva0, umva and

σ

umvl, umva. In this setting, the variance-covariance structure

Yi can be reduced to equation (A-30):
Y1 = σ mva0, umva0 + σ mva0, umvl + σ umvl, umva0 + σ2umva0

(A-30)

Y2 = σ mvl, umva0 + σ mvl, umvl + σ umvl, umva0 + σ2umvl
Y3 = σ mva, umva0 + σ mva, umvl + σ2umva

52

The variance of umva is the focus of this paper because it captures measurement error effects in
net assets.

95

There is no difference in Y1 and Y2 no matter which accounting convention is
taken, HCA or LCM. Furthermore, MVA, the market value of write-down assets,
together with Umva0 and Umvl are constant in both accounting conventions. The only
difference brought by asset write-down practice is in σ2umva, which is σ2umvah under
HCA (BVAh) and σ2umvac under LCM (BVAc); Umvaj is either Umvah or Umvac,
depending on accounting convention. I can assess the relative magnitudes of asset
write-down measurement errors by comparing Y3 values. An F test is conducted to
test whether σ2umvac and σ2umvah are equal in statistically.53 If the write-down practice
produces more measurement error in LCM than in HCA, σ2umvac should be bigger,
significantly or insignificantly. Barth’s approach is expressed as:
Y3c - Y3h =σ2umvac - σ2umvah

(A-31)

Another view of measurement error imposes no restrictions on equation (A-29) and
focuses on the integrated effects of measurement error, as in Boone (2002). Boone
argues that the covariances ignored by Barth (1991) could influence the computation
of measurement error and the final conclusion. Therefore, he includes the
covariances omitted in Barth (1991). In Boone’s method, there are two sets of
variance-covariance structures, Yih from HCA and Yic from LCM. Subtracting Yic
from Yih yields the following expression:
Y1h - Y1c = σ mva0, umvah + σ umvah, umva0 - (σ mva0, umvac + σ umvac, umva0)

(A-32)

Y2h - Y2c = σ mvl, umvah + σ umvah, umvl - (σ mvl, umvac + σ umvac, umvl )

53

This test is done in the seemingly unrelated regression model, where SAS reports an F test
while LIMDEP reports a χ2 test. The degree of freedom is one in this test. This effect of the F and χ2
should be approximately same here because the F distribution and Chi-square distribution are
essentially identical with one degree of freedom.
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Y3h - Y3c = σ mva, umvah + σ umva0, umvah + σ umvl, umvah + σ2umvah - (σ mva,
umvac + σ umva0, umvac + σ umvl, umvac + σ2umvac )
Re-arranging (A-32) yields (A-33) as follows:
Y1h + Y2h - Y3h - (Y1c + Y2c - Y3c)

(A-33)

= σ2umvac - σ2umvah + (σ mva0, umvah - σ mva0, umvac) + (σ mvl, umvah - σ mvl, umvac ) +
(σ mva, umvac -

σmva, umvach) = σ2umvac - σ2umvah + ξ ( ξ >= 0)54

The null hypothesis that function Y1h + Y2h - Y3h - (Y1c + Y2c - Y3c) >= 0 will be
rejected only if σ2umvac is significantly smaller than σ2umvah , indicating that the asset
write-down practice has reduced measurement error effectively. In other situations,
the function is biased towards a positive value under.

ξ = (σ mva0, umvah - σ mva0, umvac) + (σ mvl, umvah - σ mvl, umvac ) + (σ mva, umvac - σ mva,
umvah). Here I prove that ξ > = 0:
54

[i] σ mva0, umvah - σ mva0, umvac = Cov (mva0, Umvah) - Cov (mva0, Umvac) = Corr (mva0,
Umvah) [Var(mva0)Var(Umvah)]1/2 - Corr (mva0, Umvac) [Var(mva0)Var(Umvac)]1/2
- Corr (mva0, Umvac) [Var(mva0)Var(Umvac)]1/2
Because Cov(mva, Umvah) = Cov (mva, Umvac) <0 , Cov (mva, mva0) >0, and Umvah >
Umvac. Cov (mva, mva0) > 0 , so Corr (mva0, Umvah) = Corr(mva0, Umvac) <0 and Umvah >
Umvac, then Corr (mva0, Umvah) = Corr(mva0, Umvac) <0, [Var(mva0)Var(Umvah)]1/2 >
[Var(mva0)Var(Umvac)]1/2, and σ mva0, umvah - σ mva0, umvac < 0;
[ii] σ mvl, umvah - σ mvl, umvac = Cov (mvl, Umvah) - Cov (mvl, Umvac)
= Corr (mvl, Umvah) [Var(mvl)Var(Umvah)]1/2 - Corr (mvl, Umvac) [Var(mvl)Var(Umvac)]1/2
Because, Cov(mva, Umvah) = Cov (mva, Umvac)<0, Cov(mva, mvl) <0, Umvah > Umvac,
So Corr (mvl, Umvah) = Corr (mvl, Umvac) > 0,
[Var(mvl)Var(Umvac)]1/2. Then σ mvl, umvah - σ mvl, umvac > 0

[Var(mvl)Var(Umvah)]1/2

>

[iii] σ mva, umvac - σ mva, umvah = Cov (mva, Umvac)- Cov(mva, Umvah)
= Corr (mva, Umvac) [Var(mva)Var(Umvac)]1/2 -Corr (mva, Umvah) [Var(mva)Var(Umvah)]1/2
Because Corr (mva, Umvac) = Corr (mva, Umvah) <0 and Umvah > Umvac, so, σ mva, umvac - σ
mva, umvah >0
Combine [i], [ii] and [iii] together to get ξ in equation (A-33). Though [i] is negative, the absolute
value is much smaller compared with that of [ii] and [iii], because the magnitude of MVA0 (assets not
affected by the write-down regulation) is much smaller than that of MVL and MVA, and because
covariance is a magnitude-sensitive metric, I expect the negative part [i] to be smaller in absolute
value than the positive part [ii]+[iii]. As a result, I expect ξ to net to a positive signed value.
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